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ABSTRACT
THE RESPONSE OF COMMERCIAL BANKS
TO CREDIT STIMULI

Denise Williams Streeter
Old Dominion University, 2013
Co-Directors: Dr. Mohammed Najand
Dr. John Griffith

This dissertation calls upon the theory of financial intermediation (Diamond and
Dybvig, 1983) and the credit channel theory of monetary policy effectiveness (Bernanke
and Gertler, 1995) to show how commercial banks responded to the trillions of dollars of
innovations to stimulate the credit markets during the 2008 global financial crisis.
Specifically, loan-level data is used to conduct univariate, regression, and event-study
analyses to address the research question of, “Did United States- and European Unionbased commercial banks respond to credit stimuli with increased commercial lending
during the stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2011 when
compared to the non-stimulus period of October 1, 2002 through September 30, 2006
five years prior?”.
The univariate analysis reveals similar results for each region. In the United
States (U.S.), the data of 1,977 commercial loans to publicly traded companies in the
stimulus period and 1,844 loans in the non-stimulus period, as issued by 25 U.S.-based
commercial banks, represent an increase of $236 billion. Such loan-level univariate
analysis on 754 commercial loans to publicly traded companies in the stimulus period
and 698 commercial loans in the non-stimulus period issued by nine commercial banks
based in the European Union (EU) countries of France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom (EU3) reflect an increase of $18 billion. Commercial lending was up.

The regression analysis provides different results in each region. In the U.S., the
regressions show significant impact of the credit stimuli on the increase in commercial
lending for five of the six credit stimuli studied. However, in the EU3 countries, the
regression analysis reports a lack of significance in eight of the nine stimuli studied,
which infers that the increase in commercial lending is not in response to the credit
stimuli. Differences of approach in the provision of stimuli could explain these results.
This research contributes new findings to the financial literature. Commercial
lending increased in both the U.S. and the EU3 countries. In addition, the U.S. shows
significant influence of credit stimuli on the increase in lending. It appears that the U.S.based commercial banks responded positively to the credit stimuli.
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C H A P T E R f

INTRODUCTION
Motivation
A stimulus is designed to incite a response of action. The desired response to
credit stimuli by commercial banks around the world was that lending would be
maintained or increased from prior levels. With the focus of this research on increases in
commercial lending, this dissertation calls upon the credit channel theory of monetary
policy effectiveness to show how commercial banks responded to the trillions of dollars
of innovations offered by central banks and governments to stimulate the credit markets
during the 2008 global financial crisis.

To that end, I look at the response of United

States- and European Union-based commercial banks (i.e. specifically those based in
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) during the stimulus period of October 1,
2007 through September 30, 2011 compared to the non-stimulus1 period of October 1,
2002 through September 30, 2006 five years prior.

I conduct univariate analysis,

regressions, and event-study analysis on the impact of the various credit stimuli efforts
on commercial lending and the real economy.

Three reasons emerge as to the importance of knowing how commercial banks
carried out their function of commercial lending in response to the credit stimuli. First,
this research will aid in understanding the effectiveness of monetary policy, specifically
stimulus efforts that, according to the credit channel theory of monetary policy, should
affect the amount of credit that banks issue to firms and households and, therefore
benefit the real economy. Second, this knowledge will provide evidence to affirm or
refute the claims of the financial media that the stimuli were not working and that banks
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were hoarding cash and not performing their role as financial intermediaries in
commercial lending during the 2008 financial crisis. Third, the data lends itself to future
research on the determinative characteristics of corporate borrowers during the crisis as
a comparison can be performed of the companies that received commercial loans versus
those that did not. Such information from future research could influence strategic
planning at the corporations that seek debt financing through bank loans to drive the
economy. It is with these reasons in mind that this research persists.

In August 2007, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board (Fed)
became concerned about the state of the financial markets. More specifically, the Fed
stated in an August 17, 2007 press release that:

“Financial market conditions have deteriorated, and tighter credit conditions and
increased uncertainty have the potential to restrain economic growth going forward. In
these circumstances, although recent data suggest that the economy has continued to
expand at a moderate pace, the Federal Open Market Committee judges that the
downside risks to growth have increased appreciably. The Committee is monitoring the
situation and is prepared to act as needed to mitigate the adverse effects on the
economy arising from the disruptions in financial markets". (Federal Reserve Board,
2007a)

Later that day, the Fed determined that lending in the United States (U.S.) needed to be
stimulated “to promote the restoration of orderly conditions in the financial markets”. At
that time, the Board took its first stimulus action - the reduction of the spread between the
primary credit rate (or discount rate) and the Federal funds rate to 50 basis points.
(Federal Reserve Board, 2007b) From August 2007 through December 2012, the
spread fluctuated from a low of 25 basis points to a high of 75 basis points.

Prior to the financial crisis, the spread between the Federal Reserve’s primary
credit rate and the Federal funds rate was consistently set at 100 basis points. At the
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time of this writing, the spread had not reached the pre-crisis level of 100 basis points,
but remained at a spread of 50 basis points as shown in Figure 1, Panel A of Figure 1
depicts this rate movement based on the U.S. Federal Reserve Board’s actions. Panel B
tells the story of the rate movements based on the European Central Bank’s actions,
which reflects slower downward movement and the near maintenance of the original
spreads between the three key rates. Panel C presents the changes in the official bank
rate of the Bank of England, the central bank of the United Kingdom, which operates its
own central banking function because it has not adopted the euro as the currency of the
nation.

[Insert Figure 1 here]

In Figure 1, two clear distinctions are seen in the U.S., U.K., and EU central bank
patterns of interest rate movements. First, the U.S. central bank (i.e. the Federal
Reserve System) began adjustments of its key lending rates in August 2007 while the
U.K. central bank (i.e. Bank of England) made its first rate changes in December 2007
and the EU central bank (i.e. European Central Bank) made its first rate changes in
October 2008 after initial rate increases to maintain price stability (i.e. inflation). Second,
the U.S. central bank decreased the spread between interest rates and did not return to
the pre-crisis level of 100 basis points throughout the 2008 financial crisis, while the EU
central bank maintained the same spread between rates throughout most of the period of
rate movement as shown on Figure 1. These differences in approach to credit stimuli
could have an impact on the response of the commercial banks in the U.S. and in
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom in the EU.

In addition to the interest rate adjustments, that made less expensive funds
available for commercial banks to borrow so that they could lend to households and
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businesses, the U.S. and EU central banks engaged in stimulating credit flow via multiple
other methods during the 2008 financial crisis. In the U.S., some of those methods
included coordinated collaboration with the U.S. Department of Treasury (U.S. Treasury)
and other Federal agencies. Table 1 shows a summary of the 20 credit stimuli programs
offered to U.S.-based commercial banks.

[Insert Table 1 here]

Of the 20 credit stimuli programs included in Table 1, the Federal Reserve Board
developed fourteen of the programs, the U.S. Treasury led four of the programs, and
other Federal agencies implemented two of the programs. The Federal Reserve Board
developed its 14 credit stimuli programs within the framework of three goals set to
provide: (1) access to banks to short-term credit; (2) liquidity directly to borrowers and
investors aimed at lessening the demands on bank deposits; and (3) support to the
functioning of the overall credit markets. (Bernanke, 2009) This research focuses on the
programs related to goals one and two, as goal three extends the credit stimuli to the
mortgage market and away from commercial lending efforts. Similarly, the U.S. Treasury
introduced the Financial Stability Plan to fulfill the purposes of: (1) restarting the credit
flow, (2) cleaning up and strengthening the nation’s banks, and (3) aiding households
and small businesses. (Geithner, 2009) The goals and purposes of these programs
clearly state the intention of the Federal Reserve Board and the U.S. Treasury to
increase the amount of credit issued by banks to households and businesses.

Several stimulus programs are intentionally excluded from Table 1. The
excluded programs are those which were not implemented to stimulate the corporate
credit market. Two such programs are Quantitative Easing and Operation Twist. The
goals of those efforts were to stimulate the housing market in general and consumer
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credit in particular, as well as decrease the unemployment rate (Kenny, 2013). In both
programs, the Fed set out to lower long-term interest rates by purchasing long-term
Treasury bonds. However, the lowering of long-term interest rates might have hindered
the profits of the commercial banks (Hilsenrath and Di Leo, 2011), which could have the
opposite effect of stimulating corporate credit markets. Therefore, due to the focus of
Quantitative Easing and Operation Twist on stimulating credit to personal consumers
and the potential for it to be a dis-incentive to commercial banks to lend to corporate
borrowers, these stimulus programs are excluded from the scope of this study.

Table 2 provides a summary of stimulus support made available to specific U.S.based financial institutions from the Federal Reserve, U.S. Department of Treasury and
other government agencies. Several items of stimulus support are intentionally excluded
from Table 2. The excluded programs are those that were made available to non
commercial banks such as American International Group, Inc. (AIG), Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, GMAC, and IndyMac.

[Insert Table 2 here]

As presented in Tables 1 and 2, the Federal Reserve System and agencies of the
U.S. Federal government offered programs ranging from interest rate reductions to
greater deposit insurance to loans to support the overall credit market as well as specific
financial institutions in its efforts to stimulate credit during the 2008 financial crisis. The
amount of funds allocated to these credit stimuli programs by the Federal Reserve
System and agencies was in the multiple trillions of dollars. The programs of the Federal
Reserve System alone ranged from $1.5 trillion to $16 trillion based on the debates in
the media. However, an audit2 of the Federal Reserve System’s programs by the
Government Accounting Office (GAO) (U.S. GAO, 2011) reports the amounts
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outstanding at the peak of the credit stimuli programs as $3,243 trillion. Therefore, this
research relied on the audited amount of $3,243 trillion of credit stimuli from the Federal
Reserve System as its estimation of that portion of the funds allocated to stimulate credit.

In addition to the $3,243 trillion available to lenders via Federal Reserve System
programs, another approximately $300 billion was made available through the U.S.
Department of Treasury’s TARP programs to financial institutions, and other assistance
from other agencies, much of which cannot be quantified. For example, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) increase of the limit of deposit insurance from
$100,000 to $250,000 per depositor, per account, per institution provided security to
customers on the safety of their deposits, which is believed to have encouraged
increases in deposited funds. Such a benefit has not been quantified and is outside of
the scope of this paper. Therefore, a total of $3,543 trillion has been used as the
estimated amount of credit stimuli invested by the United States central bank and
government agencies to revive the flow of credit during the 2008 financial crisis.

In Europe, the European Central Bank (ECB) reported that its first response to
the financial crisis occurred on August 9, 2007 when it provided unlimited liquidity
through overnight central bank maturities at the prevailing rates. (Stark, 2009) The
ECB’s provision of liquidity through frontloading, lengthening of average maturities,
refinancing, using fixed-rate versus auction facilities, expanding the forms of collateral,
and other measures continued in an operational (vs. monetary policy) framework until
September 2008. (Stark 2009) It appears that the ECB’s objective of maintaining price
stability (i.e. inflation) led to this application of the separation principle in relation to
operational and monetary policy frameworks.

7

By September 2008, neither the ECB nor, the countries of focus of this study,
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (U.K.) (referred to collectively hereafter as
“EU3”) could avoid monetary policy actions. Table 3 lists the 27 stimulus programs
offered by the European Central Bank (Panel A), government of France (Panel B),
government of Germany (Panel C), and Bank of England (Panel C), in support of the
commercial banks in Europe, France, Germany, and the U.K., respectively. The
stimulus programs of the European Central Bank apply to the eligible financial
institutions of the euro-area in the European Union, except the United Kingdom, which
has not adopted the euro as its country’s currency. According to the Statutes of the
European System of Central Banks, the Banque de France and other central banks of
euro-area countries do not institute stimulus programs independent of the ECB. The role
of the euro-area central banks is to implement the programs instituted by the ECB and
the governments of the respective countries. (European Central Bank, 2008) However,
the Bank of England, the central bank of the United Kingdom, can institute its own
monetary policy because the country has not adopted the euro as its national currency.
Table 3 reflects the variety of credit stimulus actions undertaken in the European Union
and the EU countries of study - France, Germany, and the U.K.

[Insert Table 3 here]

The stated credit stimulus actions were undertaken to address the current barriers to
lending (HM Treasury, 2009) in the U.K. and to assist the financial sector in fulfilling its
role of supplying the economy with credit (Stark, 2009) in the European Union.

An interesting feature of the stimulus programs offered in the European Union is
that equal or more attention was paid to specific financial institutions than to general
credit stimulus efforts that would be available to all EU-based eligible financial

institutions. In addition, the specific stimulus support was offered by the governments of
France, Germany, and the U.K. and not by the European Central Bank. Table 4
summarizes the 14 stimulus actions provided to specific financial institutions in the EU.

[Insert Table 4 here]

In Tables 3 and 4, the funding of each program in either euros or Great Britain
pounds was converted to U.S. dollars. That conversion was performed based on the
exchange rate in place on the date of the first action of the credit stimuli effort. With the
intention to quantify the collective stimulus actions of the programs listed in Tables 3 and
4 , 1summed the general programs that could be quantified and the specific program
funds provided to the commercial banks in the sample of this study. Based on the
conversion of the efforts to U.S. dollars, this author estimates that the European Central
Bank, Bank of England, and governments of the EU3 spent $4,286 trillion in credit
stimulus actions.

Tables 2 through 4 tell the story of the trillions of dollars offered to U.S.- and EUbased commercial banks to incentivize them to engage in commercial lending. That
level of investment in credit stimuli excludes the interest rate reductions, which cannot be
quantified as to the benefit to the financial institutions, but requires an understanding of
the effectiveness of this monetary policy. In Chapters 3 and 4 of this paper, I delve into
the components of many of the programs to determine the commercial lending that
resulted from such an investment in commercial banks. At this time, I explore both the
factual and anecdotal view of the worldwide media on the stimulus spending and its
purported impact on bank lending during the 2008 financial crisis.
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After searching on terms related to the topic of this paper in the LexisNexis news
database, as well as other sources, I uncovered the hundreds of articles that were
produced during the 2008 through 2011 period. Over 40 of those articles were found to
represent the variety of views on stimulus spending and bank lending in the United
States and European Union. Table 5 presents excerpts of the media coverage of credit
stimuli efforts and the banks’ response during 2008 through 2011.

[Insert the Table 5 here]

The media reports on the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on commercial
lending globally, in the European Union, and in the United States present conflicting
variations of the status of stimulus efforts and responses. From a global view, the media
reports in October 2008 stated that governments around the world were intervening in
the financial markets to bring about restored confidence in the markets in general and
bank lending in particular. This was evidenced by efforts in both the U.S. and 15 nations
of the European Union to inject capital into the banking system and to guarantee bank
debt. (“Global Bailout,” 2008). However, by November 2008, The Banker (“Recession
looms,” 2008) reported that stock markets continued in a downward spiral even after the
gallant rescue efforts of the global collection of governments. The downturn,
incidentally, was happening at a time just after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in
September 2008 (Financial Turmoil Timeline, 2010), which could have contributed to the
stock markets’ decline and the status of lending in the U.S. and EU. Later in November
and December 2008, the U.S. and the U.K. were reported to increase their stimulus
efforts with pledges of $7.7 trillion for the U.S. (Pittman and Ivry, 2008) and an unstated
sum for the U.K. (Braude, 2008). By 2010, Hall (2010) reported in Trade Finance that
U.S. banks are “turning the corner” via earnings back to pre-crisis levels and loosening

credit standards as they wait for the demand for commercial loans to arrive so that they
can lend. Hall (2010) conceded that banks in the EU were stabilized, but had since
tightened due to liquidity concerns. Those liquidity concerns were most evident with the
chaos around the future of Dexia, one of the largest lenders in Belgium, which held
nearly €100 billion in toxic sub-prime American mortgage debts, as reported in The
Sunday Times (London). (Dey and Watts, 2010). This collection of media reports
informed the public of the similar intervention efforts of the U.S. and EU governments, as
well as the different results.

Some consistency ensued as the media reports on the efforts in the EU and
United Kingdom (U.K.) began to tell the same story about lending being down, banks
needing more capital, and government actions not happening fast enough. The
Australian Financial Review (“Europe’s leaders,” 2008) accused Europe’s leaders of
failing to take needed actions to bring the crisis under control with a “TARP-like” program
that the U.S. implemented to purchase the toxic assets from the banks. In two articles in
the Financial Times, Alloway (2011) stated that European banks were facing excessive
funding problems and used French banks as an example based on their lead in
borrowing from the European Central Bank (ECB).

This consistency in reporting the

trouble in the EU approach and results carried over into the media’s reporting on U.K.
efforts.

Given that the U.K. is a member of the European Union, but does not use the
euro as its currency; instead retaining use of the Great Britain Pound (GBP), the U.K.
operates under the guidance of its own central bank - Bank of England. As shown in
Table 5, the media reports that focused on the U.K. proudly announced the proposed
new stimulus in 2008 (Braude, 2008), but just as clearly informed the public of the Bank
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of England’s (BoE) 2009 admission that the new stimulus policies were not successful as
bank lending continued to slow (Monaghan, 2009). In 2010, the BoE went so far as to
stop its injections into the economy due to its presumed lack of effectiveness (“Not
Easy”, 2010). By 2011, The Sunday Times (London) reported that “bank gloom
deepens over UK economy” (Oakeshott and Watts, 2011).

In the United States, however, controversy developed not only about the amount
of money being spent to stimulate bank lending, but also on whether the spending was
making a difference in the increased issuance of commercial loans. From 2008 to 2011,
the media reported that amounts ranging from $1.5 trillion to $16 trillion had been spent
on stimulating commercial credit. Bloomberg news went as far to say that the Federal
Reserve’s spending was done in secret and without the full knowledge of Congress, but
its reports could not determine if the amount was $13 billion (Ivry, et al 2011) or $1.2
trillion (Keoun and Kuntz, 2011. The media also stated that bank lending had fallen
faster than at any other time in history (Evans-Pritchard, 2010) and that banks were
recovering, but that commercial lending still lagged demand (Recap, 2011). Table 5
shares the headlines that focused on the U.S. Not only does the referenced media
coverage contradict itself, but much of the U.S. media’s reports were called into question
by the top official of the Federal Reserve Board.

In a letter to Congress (Bernanke, 2011), Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben
Bernanke expressed his concerns over the discrepancies in the information presented by
the media. He raised six areas of disagreement with the media’s coverage of the Federal
Reserve’s stimulus programs during the 2008 financial crisis. Chairman Bernanke clarified
each of the six areas of disagreement. First, with regard to “secret lending”, he stated that
there were no secrets from Congress as each program was publicly announced and
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monthly reports are provided to Congress on the volume of borrowing by large banks.
Second, on the discrepancies around the amount of the stimulus effort, Mr. Bernanke
responded that the amount of the stimulus spending was $1.5 trillion at the peak of the
liquidity programs and was in the form of credit outstanding. He reminded the media and
Congress that “lending is not spending” such that many of the programs involve loans to
banks, not grants, that will be repaid to the Federal Reserve with interest. In addition,
there were many parts of the economy that were being addressed by the stimulus
programs (i.e. credit market, housing market, overall financial markets, etc.) so that ail
should be careful of overlap in the analysis. Third, Chairman Bernanke was concerned
that the media has not actively reported on the audit of the programs by the Government
Accounting Office (GAO)2 or the interest income generated by the loans to the banks that
repays the American taxpayers. Fourth, given that the media accused the Federal
Reserve of only lending to large banks, Mr. Bernanke stated in his letter to Congress that
loans were made to 900,000 small businesses and banks, as well as others. Fifth, Mr.
Bernanke asked the media to not depict the banks that received such stimulus support as
“insolvent” or “in deep trouble” as the goal of the stimulus support was to keep banks from
that condition and such comments could discourage bank participation. Sixth, and lastly,
Chairman Bernanke admonished the media for implying that the banks received belowmarket loans from the Federal Reserve and then reaped benefits without lending to others.
He reminded Congress that the loans included a penalty to encourage repayment, which
removes any possibility of the loans being a subsidy to the borrowing banks. It is clear that
Chairman Bernanke took exception to much of what the media reported about the credit
stimuli programs of the Federal Reserve System and the banking system in general.

13

Given the trillions of dollars of innovations offered by central banks and
governments to stimulate the credit markets during the 2008 global financial crisis and
the discrepancies in the media coverage, this research is motivated by the desire to
uncover the truth in the media coverage and the need to determine how commercial
banks responded to such an exorbitant investment in credit stimuli. This determination
will address the effectiveness of monetary policy on commercial lending.

Research Questions and Design
The focus of this research is on the change in the number and value of loans
issued over the stimulus period of October 2007 through September 2011 compared to
the non-stimulus period of October 2002 through September 2006. The research
questions to be addressed test the bank lending channel component of the credit channel
theory by exploring the perspectives of financial institutions, international finance, and
corporate finance. To that end, I study the commercial lending that resulted from the credit
stimuli offered to incentivize commercial banks in the United States and the two countries
of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (U.K.) in the European Union.

The two research questions will be addressed in Chapters 3 and 4 of this
dissertation. In Chapter 3 , 1answer the research question, “Did United States-based
commercial banks respond to credit stimuli with increased commercial lending during the
stimulus period of October 2007 through September 2011 when compared to the non
stimulus period of October 2002 through September 2006 five years prior?” Chapter 4
addresses the response in France, Germany, and the U.K. by answering the research
question, “Did France-, Germany-, and United Kingdom-based commercial banks respond
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to credit stimuli with increased commercial lending during the stimulus period of October
2007 through September 2011 when compared to the non-stimulus period of October
2002 through September 2006 five years prior?” The answers to these research questions
will be uncovered through a robust research design.

To test these research questions, I use loan-level data from the ThomsonOne
database. The 2,734 loans in the stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through September
30, 2011 and 2,542 loans in the non-stimulus period of October 1, 2002 through
September 30, 2006 were selected based on dates of funding requests and ultimate
approval in the stated periods.

(NOTE:

More details on the sample are provided in

Chapter 2). Though Contessi and Francis (2009) state that actual loan origination data
is needed for analysis of the credit activity of commercial banks, due to the lack of
access to loan origination data (i.e. loan applications, etc.), this loan-level data provides
an excellent source of detail for this testing and exceeds the benefits of summary
balance sheet or aggregate data.

The sample of lenders for this study was determined based on the loan-level
data. A lender was included in the sample if it issued at least one loan during both of the
stated periods - the stimulus period and the non-stimulus period - and was registered as
a commercial bank. Loan activity in both periods was necessary for the calculation of
the change in lending for each lender.

As the database of loans includes both

transactions by single banks as well as syndicates, any transaction that included a
lender included in the sample was counted as a transaction for that lender even though
the other lenders in the syndicate were excluded from the sample.

However, only the

amount of the transaction to which the sample’s lender contributed to the deal was
counted in the loan activity.
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To capture the loan activity of the lenders that are U.S.-based commercial banks,
based on the entity’s primary SIC code, I used the National Information Center (NIC) of
the Federal Reserve to identify relationships between entities. Non-commercial banks
were excluded from the sample as well as those with foreign parents.

The original

sample of 71 lenders became 45 commercial banks. To ensure the ability to conduct the
event-study analysis for the economic importance of this study, I grouped the 45
commercial banks into the 25 parent companies that serve as the trading entity for the
subsidiary banks. The lending response of the 45 subsidiaries was included with that of
the parent banks to capture total loan-level activity in both periods of study.

For the

lenders based in France, Germany, and the U.K., the same analysis of entity
relationships was conducted. The result was that the original sample of 32 EU lenders
was grouped into nine commercial banks based in either France, Germany, or the U.K.
Overall, the commercial loans for the stimulus and non-stimulus periods, as funded by
the commercial banks based in the U.S., France, Germany, or the U.K. were tested to
address the two research questions.

Based on the approaches used in existing financial literature, I conduct univariate
analysis, regressions, and event-study analysis to address each research question. With
the change in loan quantity and loan value between the stimulus period and the non
stimulus period, by commercial bank, being the dependent variables, the regression
models capture the impact of the bank’s participation in credit stimuli based on either the
dollar value of benefit or a dummy variable representation. Endogeneity concerns are
addressed by the use of lagged independent variables and an instrumental variable
approach. The regression models are designed not only to answer the research questions
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of whether or not the credit stimuli influenced the change in commercial lending, but also to
provide insight into how size of bank or an increase or decrease in lending was impacted.

The event-study analysis is conducted to determine if there was an economic
impact (i.e. benefit or cost) to the commercial banks for participating in the credit stimuli
programs. This analysis does not address stigma issues, but is designed to guide
awareness on the reactions of the respective stock markets to stimuli participation.

In Chapters 2 through 5, this dissertation presents further analysis of the response
of the U.S.-based, and the France-, Germany-, and UK-based commercial banks. Chapter
2 presents the theoretical background and univariate analysis of the data. Chapter 3
shows the regressions and event-study analysis of the commercial lending response of
U.S.-based commercial banks. Chapter 4 reflects analysis of the commercial lending
response of France-, Germany-, and UK-based commercial banks. Chapter 5 makes
conclusions.
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CWMPTEn 2
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Theoretical Foundation
Expansionary monetary policy is used by a central bank to increase the money
supply of an economy and to stimulate spending. In large and open economies such as
the United States and the European Union countries of France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom, the use of expansionary monetary policy has the effects on the goods market
(IS) and the money market (LM) as shown in Figure 2, which represents the MundellFleming Model (i.e. the IS/LM curve for open economies). According to Mankiw (2010)
and classical economic theory, the increase in the money supply, as brought on by
expansionary monetary policy, results in a shift of the LM curve to the right to reflect the
increase in income. This increase in income leads to a fall in real interest rates, which is
designed to spur net capital outflow by way of bank lending.

[Insert Figure 2 here]

These relationships between the supply of credit (as well as the demand for credit)
and interest rates are reinforced in the Loanable Funds Model developed in 1965 by Knut
Wicksell (Belke and Polleit, 2009). In the Loanable Funds Model, the supply of credit is
defined as not only credit provided by lenders (i.e. commercial banks and others), but also
funds acquired through the sell of bonds and new credit made available by the monetary
policy of the Federal Reserve System (Evans, 1999). If the goal of monetary policy is to
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create credit, the Federal Reserve will do so through open market operations that increase
the money supply (or expansionary monetary policy). Such a monetary policy approach
should result in a decrease in interest rates, which the Loanable Funds Model states has
the effect of increasing the supply of credit.

Further study of the IS/LM Model and the Loanable Funds Model resulted in
Bernanke and Blinder’s (1988) development of the credit channel theory of monetary
policy effectiveness. The credit channel theory, with its two components of a balance
sheet channel and a bank lending channel (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995), states that
changes in a central bank’s policies not only affect the amount of credit that banks issue to
firms and households, but also affects the real economy. Though the credit channel is
best described as an enhancement to monetary policy transmission rather than the
mechanism itself, it also can be seen as a set of factors that heighten the effects of
changes in interest rates in expansionary [or contracting] economic times. Black and
Rosen (2007) successfully evaluate the effects of the two channels of the credit channel
separately and find that the balance sheet channel causes banks to reallocate their short
term lending toward large firms and the bank lending channel causes banks to reduce
the maturity of their loans in periods of tightened monetary policy.

The balance sheet channel explains that the extension of credit to creditworthy
borrowers with collateral reduces the lender’s credit risks. (Bernanke, 2007). However,
even with collateral, there is still a cost to the borrower for raising funds through external
financing such as commercial loans. That cost to the borrower is broadly described as the
“external finance premium” and reflects the net of the cost of borrowing externally and the
opportunity cost of using internal funds. Bernanke (2007) clarifies that the theory expects
that the external finance premium will always be positive, but will be lower for borrowers
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with strong financial positions based on net worth and liquidity ratios. His research also
found that the external finance premium can decrease further in subsequent periods if the
firm experiences an increase in productivity that improves its cash flows. This finding
Bernanke (2007) named the “financial accelerator theory”.

Though Diaz and Olivero (2010) do not directly study the financial accelerator
theory, they do develop a model based on its concepts in relation to firm-level data and the
supply of credit by banks. In looking at the heterogeneity (or differences) in firm
characteristics, Diaz and Olivero (2010) state that it is the high-risk small firms that seek to
use bank lending, while the low-risk large firms can find alternative sources of financing,
such as direct debt through bond issuance. In their modeled setting of a monetary
contraction, they show that the cost (or “external finance premium”) to the small borrower
limits the small firm’s financing options, but increases the options for the large firm. Using
the Diaz and Olivero (2010) contractionary monetary policy scenario as the “opposing
view”, this research will look for the impact of the expansionary monetary policy during the
2008 financial crisis on firms also based on firm size with regard to bank financing.

The bank lending channel component of the credit channel theory states that the
supply of bank loans issued by financial institutions is affected, in part, by the work of
monetary policy. (Bernanke, 2007). Gambacorta (2002) provides a look at the bank
lending channel from the heterogeneous multi-nation European Union perspective where
the credit channel has been identified in Italy and the United Kingdom, but not in Germany
and the Netherlands. Therefore, he set out to determine if an “optimal monetary policy”
could be effected to address the various bank lending channels of the member countries.
He found that the “optimal monetary policy” must capture financial indicators and the
nature of the country of origin of the financial shock. With the inclusion of the United
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States in the analysis, Gambacorta and Marques-lbanez (2011) show that banks in
Europe and the U.S. experienced changes in bank-specific characteristics prior to the
2008 financial crisis that limited the operation of the bank lending channel during the crisis.

Overall, through the study of the credit channel theory, this author aims to
determine the lending response of U.S.- and European Union-based commercial banks to
credit-stimulating monetary policy. Prior research offers conflicting evidence. Morris and
Sellon, Jr. (1995) and Ashcraft (2006) found that banks do not respond to tightened
monetary policy as business lending occurred in spite of the restrictions. Ashcraft (2006)
went further to state that banks respond to direct financial limitations in lending rather than
to monetary policy. However, Hendricks and Kempa (2011) found that the credit channel
becomes active during times of financial distress whether monetary policy is contracting or
expanding.

Contributions to the Literature
The results of this research will contribute new knowledge to the financial
literature in three key areas. First, the results will inform banking regulators and policy
makers on how commercial banks in the U.S., France, and U.K. responded to the credit
stimuli.

Second, the results will provide insight to the decision makers at commercial

banks regarding the resources offered by central banks in a troubled economy. Third,
the results will update the financial mass media on the realities of commercial lending
during the 2008 financial crisis.
information.

The univariate results already provide intriguing
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Data and Univariate Analysis
The data used for this research is derived from the Thomson One database of
loan-level data of commercial loans requested worldwide on the dates of October 1,
2002 through September 30, 2006 (i.e. the “non-stimulus period”) and October 1, 2007
through September 30, 2011 (i.e. the “stimulus period”). The non-stimulus period1,
which is five years prior to the stimulus period, was selected as the timeframe when
there were no central bank or government actions in place to purposely stimulate the
credit markets. The stimulus period was determined based on the start of the Federal
Reserve Board’s stimulus actions in August 2007 with a lag of about two months built
into the starting period of the data with the anticipation that the benefits of the August
2007 stimulus action would be identified first in October 2007 (or later). Further analysis
will be conducted to confirm or deny this anticipated lag in response to the credit stimuli.

The paper first compares, through univariate analysis, the demand and supply of
commercial loans requested from corporations and governments worldwide during the
stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2011 and the non-stimulus
period of October 1, 2002 through September 30, 2006. In Panel A of Table 6, a
summary of loan-level data from Thomson One reflects that the total of loans requested
during the stimulus period was 49,053 requests compared to 50,858 requests in the non
stimulus period. In summary, the level of demand for loans from corporate and
government requestors in the stimulus period was a decrease of only 3.5% of the loans
requested in the non-stimulus period. The loan demand stated above includes about
33,000 (or 65 to 67%) loan requests in both periods from non-public entities, such as
governments, private companies, subsidiaries, and joint ventures. Those non-public
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companies were excluded from the data sample to focus this research on publicly traded
corporations.

After excluding the non-public entities from this data sample, the demand for
loans from public companies, as reflected by the line item titled, “Net Loans Requested
from Researchable Public Companies” is down by 1,106 loan requests (or 6.5%) over
the two periods. However, with regard to the value of the loan demand, financial
institutions in both the stimulus and non-stimulus period received total loan requests
from public companies of approximately $11.4 trillion. Overall, this level of demand for
loans from public companies further shows that the value of loan demand remained
strong during these two periods.

With regard to the supply of loans to publicly traded corporations, the data in
Panel A of Table 6 shows that total approved loans to public companies increased in
quantity and dollar value in the stimulus period compared to the non-stimulus period.
More specifically, only 1,747 loan requests from public companies were denied in the
stimulus period compared to 4,896 denied requests in the non-stimulus period. It must
be noted here that the denied loan requests are those that were not funded by a financial
institution or syndicate by September 30, 2011 for the stimulus period or by September
30, 2006 for the non-stimulus period. Those loan requests funded after the end of the
period were excluded from this analysis. The net result is that 14,045 commercial loans
were approved for publicly traded corporations in the stimulus period while only 12,002
commercial loans were approved in the non-stimulus period, which reflects a 17%
increase in the quantity of loans approved in the stimulus period. The dollar value of
loans approved to publicly traded companies reflects a 35% increase during the stimulus
period when one compares the $9.4 trillion in loan value in the stimulus period to the $7
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trillion in loan value in the non-stimulus period. Based on this univariate analysis, it is
clear that, worldwide, greater commercial loan quantity and value were supplied during
the stimulus period than during the non-stimulus period.

This research provides further analysis of commercial loans funded by
commercial banks based in the United States and the two countries of the European
Union. In Panel B of Table 6, the “Total Loans Funded by All Lenders” is netted to reflect
the net loans funded by the commercial banks of the sample that are based in the United
States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, in aggregate. Those three countries
of the European Union were chosen for focused study because the financial institutions
in each country represent the top lenders in the stimulus and non-stimulus periods.
With a total of 2,731 loans to be studied in the stimulus period and 2,542 loans in the
non-stimulus period, the data once again shows that more commercial lending occurred
in the stimulus period than in the non-stimulus period. However, it must be stated that
the percentage of loans funded given the volume of requests during each period is down
at 19.4% (i.e. 2,731/14,045) in the stimulus period compared to 21.2% (i.e.
2,542/12,002) in the non-stimulus period. The value of the commercial loans to be
studied is, however, an increase in the stimulus period over the non-stimulus period.

The line items of Panel C of Table 6 show that both the U.S.- based and EUbased commercial banks made more loans in the stimulus period versus the non
stimulus period. However, the EU-based commercial banks in France, Germany, and
the U.K. distributed fewer dollars ($ mil) in the stimulus period than in the non-stimulus
period. This univariate analysis provides preliminary data that demand for commercial
loans was at comparable levels during the stimulus period and that the supply of credit
was up in both regions.
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[Insert Table 6 here]

Table 7 provides summary statistics of the final data sample based on the
response of commercial banks based in the U.S. and the EU countries of France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom. The first two columns of data reflect the comparison
of the stimulus period activity for the U.S. versus the three countries of the European
Union. There, it is seen that U.S.-based commercial banks issued greater than 3.5 times
more loan value than the EU3-based commercial banks. In addition, the minimum loan
value for U.S.-based commercial loans was twice that of the EU3 commercial loans in
the stimulus period, while the U.S.-based maximum loan values were 1.79 times more
than the size of those from the EU countries. Overall, the average size of the
commercial loans issued in the U.S. were 36% greater in the stimulus period, while
France, Germany, and the UK collectively issued commercial loans that were about the
same average size over the two periods of study. However, the average time to final
maturity for all countries decreased from the non-stimulus period to the stimulus period.

[Insert Table 7 here]

These summary statistics are shown graphically on an annual basis for U.S.based commercial banks and EU3-based commercial banks in Figures 3 and 4,
respectively. In Panel A of each figure, the graph reflects the number of commercial
loans issued by year. Notice that Panel A of Figure 3 depicts that U.S.-based
commercial banks increased the number of commercial loans issued in period three, or
the October 2009 through September 2010 stimulus period, over the loans issued in the
non-stimulus period. On the other hand, Panel A of Figure 4 shows that the EU3-based
commercial banks issued fewer loans in periods two and four of the stimulus period than
those issued in the non-stimulus period. With regard to total loan value and average
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loan size, by year, Panels B and C of each figure, respectively tell opposing stories for
U.S. versus the three countries of the EU. In Figure 3, the U.S.-based commercial banks
report commercial loan values and average loan sizes in the stimulus period greater than
those in the non-stimulus period starting in period 2, or the annual period of October
2008 through September 2009. However, the EU3-based commercial banks fell behind
in period 3 of the stimulus period when compared to the non-stimulus period as shown in
Panels B and C of Figure 4. The story here preliminarily appears to be that commercial
banks in the U.S. responded with increases in commercial lending in period 2 of the
stimulus period, while the EU3-based commercial banks responded with decreases in
commercial lending in period 3 of the stimulus period. The regressions and event-study
analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 will further evaluate these univariate results.

[Insert Figure 3 here]

[Insert Figure 4 here]

I now turn to a look at the publicly traded corporations that requested loans
during the stimulus and non-stimulus periods.

Figure 5 highlights the percentages of all

publicly traded corporations whose requests for funding were approved versus denied.
In Panel A, it is seen that the stimulus period resulted in 83% of requested commercial
loans approved versus 17% denied. In Panel B, the presentation shows that the non
stimulus period resulted in only 61% of requested commercial loans being approved
while 39% were denied. This data provides another depiction of an increase in
commercial loan issuance in the stimulus period (i.e. 83% approved) versus the non
stimulus period (i.e. 61% approved).
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[Insert Figure 5 here]

To understand more about the denied requesting corporations and the borrowers,
I examined the three characteristics of home country, industry, and proposed use of
proceeds for each loan request. For ease of analysis, this examination compares the
denied requestors to those corporations that became borrowers of U.S.-based lenders.
First, Figure 6 shows the top five home countries of the denied requestors and the
borrowers in the stimulus period (Panel A) and the non-stimulus period (Panel B). Of the
denied requestors, 100% of the requesting corporations in both periods are based in
Australia. It must also be noted that 97% of the requesting corporations in the stimulus
period and 99% of the requesting corporations in the non-stimulus period are based in
the United Kingdom. Of the borrowers, 71% of the requesting corporations in the
stimulus period and 42% of the requesting corporations in the non-stimulus periods are
based in the United States. In summary, a greater percentage of U.S. corporations were
approved for commercial loans by U.S.-based commercial banks in the stimulus period
(i.e. 71.32%) than in the non-stimulus period (i.e. 41.89%).

[Insert Figure 6 here]

The second characteristic of the requesting corporations being examined is the
primary industries of operation. After grouping the primary SIC codes of each publicly
traded requesting corporation into the Fama-French 12-industry groupings, it became
clear which industries received more approval than denial in the stimulus versus the non
stimulus period. In Panel A of Figure 7, it shows that requesting corporations in the
industries of business equipment (6), shops (or retail) (9), and healthcare (10) received
more loan approvals than denials in the stimulus period. In Panel B of Figure 7, none of
the industries received more loan approvals than denials in the non-stimulus period.
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However, Panel B does show that, during the non-stimulus period, commercial loans
were approved for corporations in the consumer durables (2), business equipment (6),
and shops (or retail) (9) industries more than any others. This view of the data shows
that publicly traded corporations in the business equipment (6) and shops (or retail) (9)
industries have been approved for commercial loans in both periods. Per Panel C of
Figure 7, the data highlights three industries that were consistently approved for
commercial loans less than the other industries. Those three industries with the lowest
net approval rates over the two periods are utilities (8), money (which includes banks
and other financial institutions) (11) and other (12). With this result, the univariate
analysis informs that the U.S-based commercial banks being evaluated not only did not
lend primarily to other financial institutions in the money industry, but approved loans
during the stimulus period to publicly traded corporations in the industries of business
equipment (6), shops (or retail) (9), and healthcare (10).

[Insert Figure 7 here]

The third characteristic being examined is the proposed use of the proceeds
being requested for the commercial loan. Based on the loans requested in the stimulus
period of October 2007 through September 2011, 42 proposed uses of proceeds were
represented. Panel A of Figure 8 shows the 14 uses of proceeds that experienced
positive net loan approval rates. Loans requesting to use the proceeds for the
redemption of A-class shares and secondary market offerings received the highest
percentage of loan approval in the stimulus period. Panel B of Figure 8 shows the 16
uses of proceeds that resulted in negative net loan approval rates. The least approved
(i.e. the largest negative net approval rate) proposed uses of proceeds were
construction, refinancing, and ship financing. Table 8 shows the 12 other proposed uses
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of proceeds that were fully denied in the stimulus period though these same proposed
uses of proceeds received some loan approval in the non-stimulus period. This
univariate analysis implies that U.S.-based commercial banks approved debt issuance to
fund equity market activity, but not more operational uses of proceeds, during the
stimulus period.

[Insert Figure 8 here]

[Insert Table 8 here]

Based on the Thomson One loan-level data being used in this research, the
univariate analysis provides evidence on how commercial banks responded during the
stimulus period compared to the non-stimulus period. From the data, it is revealed that
the U.S.-based commercial banks in the sample responded positively, presumably to the
credit stimuli, through increased number and value of commercial loans issued during
the stimulus period of October 2007 through September 2011 when compared to the non
stimulus period of October 2002 through September 2006 five years prior. With regard to
the France-, and UK-based commercial banks, it appears that there was a negative
response, presumably to the credit stimuli, as evidenced by the decreased number and
value of commercial loans issued during the stimulus period when compared to the non
stimulus period five years prior. Chapters 3 and 4 reflect regression and event-study
analysis for a more robust examination of the data.
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CWAPTER 3
THE RESPONSE OF U.S.-BASED COMMERCIAL BANKS
TO CREDIT STIMULI

Literature Review
To determine if the credit stimuli positively or negatively influenced commercial
lending, it is important to understand the key factors needed for commercial banks to
lend and whether or not the credit stimuli of the central banks and government agencies
addressed those factors. Madura (2012) states that one key factor for banks to make
loans and other investments is the availability of funds. He identifies such sources of
funds as deposits, borrowed funds, bond issues, and bank capital. These sources and
other factors are considered in relation to the influence of credit stimuli on commercial
lending.

More specifically, researchers have found impacts on lending from several
factors. Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Ghosh (2008) found that lending was down
when the demand for loans was down. Therefore, loan demand is a key factor of loan
supply (or lending). In looking at the data for this study, Table 6 provides evidence that
the demand for loans remained strong at $11.4 trillion in both the stimulus period of
October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2011 and the non-stimulus period of October 1,
2002 through September 30, 2006. Another factor of lending is the level of lending
standards (Lown and Morgan, 2002) imposed by banks on potential borrowers. Figure 9
reflects the responses of loan officers of the 51 domestic banks and 22 U.S. branches
and agencies of foreign banks who completed the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey
on Bank Lending Practices as reported by the Federal Reserve System. The figure
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shows that lending standards tightened more during the stimulus period when compared
to the non-stimulus period. According to Lown and Morgan (2002, 2006), tightened
lending standards lead to reduced commercial loan growth. Presuming that the opposite
is also true (i.e. reduced lending standards lead to increased commercial loan growth), it
must be noted that net tightening reduced during the latter half of the stimulus period, as
also shown in Figure 9.

[Insert Figure 9 here]

Other researchers examined the profitability of lending (Shrieves and Dahl, 1995;
Lown and Morgan, 2002; Park, 2006); and risk aversion (Berger and Udell, 1994;
Shrieves and Dahl, 1995; Brinkmann and Horvitz, 1995) which led to conclusions that
banks reduced or withheld from lending when the loans were not profitable or when the
risks were too high to justify the return. Though the stated results on profitability and risk
aversion were widely supported, the results were not as clear on the impact of capital
and deposits, as sources of funds3, on bank lending during a financial crisis.

Therefore, three further streams of literature were followed to explore these
ambiguous factors. First, I reviewed the literature on the impact of risk-based capital
requirements on lending. Second, I looked at what other researchers uncovered about
the availability of funds on deposit and the implications of deposit insurance on lending. .
Third, I examined the research on the effects of monetary policy on bank lending. This
literature review summarizes the findings of relevant research in these literature streams.

With regard to the literature on the sources of funds for commercial lending in the
United States, several papers add insight on capital and deposits available for lending.
After the implementation of risk-based capital requirements of Basel I4 in the early
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1990s, which required banks to hold capital in proportion to their perceived credit risks,
much research was conducted on whether this requirement for banks to put more capital
aside would decrease, have no impact, or increase commercial lending. The existing
literature reached conflicting results in making the determination regarding the impact of
Basel I. VanHoose (2007) states it best in his survey paper on the topic and leads to an
inconclusive result on the impact. However, based on the papers studied by this author,
56% report findings that increased risk-based capital requirements led to decreases in
commercial lending (Peek and Rosengren, 1996; Shrieves and Dahl, 1995; Thakor,
1996; Stanton, 1998; Diamond and Rajan, 2000; Bernauerand Koubi, 2002; Honda,
2004; Berrospide and Edge, 2010; and Gambacorta and Marquez-lbanez, 2011). The
percentage of papers that found no change in lending based on increased risk-based
capital requirements goes down to 25% and includes papers by Bernanke and Lown
(1991), Berger and Udell (1994), Brinkman and Horvitz (1995), Peek and Rosengren
(1995), Park (2006), and Ghosh (2008). Finally, 19% of the research on capital
requirements showed that, in cases of stronger banks with excess capital,
implementation of Basel I led to increases in lending (Brinkmann and Horvitz, 1995;
Bernauer and Koubi, 2002; and Cole, 2012). Though VanHoose’s (2007) summarization
shows that the literature is inconclusive on the impact of risk-based capital requirements,
more than half (i.e. 56%) of the existing literature reviewed by this author found that
increased risk-based capital requirements lead to decreased lending.

The research on the importance of deposits as a source of funding for bank
lending also faces mixed results. Researchers who examined the impact of bank
deposits reached different conclusions. Edwards and Mishkin (1995) stated that the
original near-zero interest costs on deposits gave banks an advantage when they could
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lend those deposited funds at profitable rates. The reversal of that advantage occurred
in the 1980s when other financial institutions began offering earnings on deposits.
Banks were then forced to seek (and gain) the elimination of Regulation Q that put a
ceiling on the interest that it could pay on deposits. Edwards and Mishkin (1995) added
that such developments reduced the importance of deposits as a funding source for
banks to lend. However, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) and Mora (2010) found
significance in a bank’s deposit holdings. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) examined the
number of loan transactions from 2000 to 2006 and found that new loans to large
borrowers fell by 47% during the peak of the 2008 crisis (4th quarter), relative to the prior
quarter, and by 79% relative to the peak of the credit boom (2nd quarter of 2007) in line
with changes in deposits. They state that banks’ loans receivables increased due to
draws on credit lines, rather than new loan issuances, and loans payable decreased due
to a run by short-term bank creditors. In general, they associated the decrease in
lending during the 2008 financial crisis with the decrease in deposits. Mora (2010)
presented further evidence, both from aggregate and individual bank data, that funds did
not flow into bank deposits as robustly as in past times of stress and, therefore, bank
lending did not increase as much. Given the conflicting views of these researchers on
the importance of deposits to lending, I look at the role of deposit insurance to resolve
these differences.

Deposit insurance was developed to provide a safety net to depositors and
bankers alike. Though it was in place in various forms prior to the establishment of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the deposit insurance provisions of the
Banking Act of 1933 officially formed the FDIC and deposit insurance terms. (FDIC,
1998). While proponents of deposit insurance believed that it would aid in maintaining
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financial stability in the banking sector, opponents at the time saw the potential for
additional risk-taking by bankers covered by insurance protection. In a 2000 paper,
Diamond and Rajan studied the impact of deposit insurance on lending and found that
bank lending is reduced when not all of the deposits are insured, but that lending
increases when all deposits are insured as the banks are “safe” to invest in loans due to
the insurance subsidy. On the other hand, in a policy research working paper for The
World Bank, Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, and Zhu (2012wp) looked at over 4,000 banks in
96 countries in periods of crisis and non-crisis to determine the impact of deposit
insurance on bank risk-taking. They found that, during the period of non-crisis, the
safety net provided by deposit insurance increased bank risk-taking and reduced overall
financial stability. However, during the period of crisis, deposit insurance did not lead to
increased bank risk, as such was lower, and greater systemic stability ensued. The net
effect was that the non-crisis period’s results were more dominant and, overall, deposit
insurance led to increased bank risk and reduced stability. As the focus of this paper is
on periods of financial crisis, the results from the crisis-period testing apply to this work
and, during crisis periods, the researcher found that deposit insurance led to reduced
bank risk taking.

With regard to periods of financial crisis, the existing financial literature
addresses the effects of monetary policy on bank lending both in general and in relation
to specific credit stimuli programs.

Thakor (1996) developed a model that explained

that the Fed’s effort to stimulate bank lending by increasing the money supply during the
1990-1991 “credit crunch” was unsuccessful because the effect of monetary policy
depends on its effects on the term structure of interest rates. According to the model, if
monetary policy increases the money supply, but decreases short-term interest rates
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more than long-term rates, then lending decreases. Similarly, Thakor (1996) found that if
monetary policy increases the money supply, but decreases long-term rates more than
short-term rates, then lending remains flat or increases. Diamond and Rajan (2000)
looked at the level of the increase in cash (i.e. capital) infused by a central bank into the
banking sector. They found that if the amount of cash is only large enough to prevent
bank runs, for example, then loans could be recalled and lending standards tightened,
which, according to other researchers, would lead to reductions in lending. On the other
hand, if the amount of cash is considered “substantially large”, they found that banks can
extend new loans. In studying over 900,000 transactions during the period of 1976
through 1993, Kashyap and Stein (2000) found that monetary policy’s effect on lending is
stronger for banks with less liquid balance sheets, which is typically the smaller banks.
They also found that the largest banks make heavier use of the Federal funds market
whereas the smaller banks made very little to no use of Federal funds to aid liquidity.
Similarly, Keister and McAndrews (2009) studied the high levels of bank excess reserves
and found that such excess is simply a by-product of the Federal Reserve’s new lending
facilities and asset purchase programs. However, they qualified their findings by stating
that the reality of bank’s holding excess reserves provides no information about the
initiatives’ effects on bank lending or on the economy. Therefore, the liquidity of the
balance sheet could be a determinant of commercial lending along with interest rates
(Thakor, 1996) and capital infusions (Diamond and Rajan, 2000).

In addition to the impact of the items stated above, researchers examined the
direct effect of specific credit stimulus programs on bank lending. Berrospide and Edge
(2010) concluded that the extensive capital injections under the Capital Purchase
Program of TARP did not lead to growth in lending because banks base loan decisions
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on either demand or risk or both rather than levels of capital. Stolz and Wedow (2010)
conducted a comparison of the measures put in place by the central banks of the
European Union, United Kingdom and the United States and the effectiveness of those
measures. With regard to the actions taken by the U.S. Federal Reserve System to
stimulate credit, they found that: (1) dollar funded pressures were reduced as a result of
the swap lines arranged by the Fed with several other nations; (2) after the issuance of
facilities to support the primary dealers, spreads in the interbank market narrowed, but
were still above the pre-crisis levels; and (3) the evidence is inconclusive on the ability of
the Term Auction Facilities (TAF) to lower spreads. Stolz and Wedow (2010) also point
out that the Fed received a profitable return of interest income on many of its measures,
but do not provide any view as to whether the measures stimulated overall credit, which
was the initial goal. Berger, Black, Bouwman, and Dlugosz (2012wp) studied the impact
of the availability of discount window and term auction facilities in relation to bank
lending and found no evidence that the banks that participated in those programs
increased lending when compared to the banks that did not participate. Black and
Hazelwood (2012) studied the effect of TARP on bank risk-taking and find that, relative
to non-TARP banks, the risk of loan originations increased at large TARP banks, but
decreased at small TARP banks. However, at large TARP banks, there was an increase
in risk-taking without an increase in lending; possibly due to the conflicting goals of the
TARP program for bank capitalization and bank lending. Cole (2012), in looking at the
particular impact of stimulus efforts on lending to small businesses, concluded that TARP
participants decreased lending to businesses of all sizes more so than did non-TARP
participants. Overall, the existing financial literature concludes that bank lending was
down even after the many credit stimulus efforts during the 2008 financial crisis.
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In other words, these researchers state that the credit stimulus did not stimulate
bank lending due to the stimulus being too small as well as the conflicting goals of
stimulus programs such as TARP and interest on excess reserves, among other reasons
as stated above. However, most of the referenced papers used data on more than one
loan type and each of the papers covered loan activity in periods that ended before or
during 2009, which was near the height of the crisis. This paper analyzes data on
commercial loans only to remove the possible effect of netting commercial loan activity
with that of the other loan types and, not only extends the period to September 2011 to
show the potential lag in the response to the credit stimuli and, but also compares the
stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2011 to a non-stimulus period
of October 1, 2002 through September 30, 2006 (i.e. five years prior to the stimulus
period) as a form of “control period”. In addition, this paper looks at not only the change
in the number of loan transactions, as Ivashina and Sharfstein (2010) did, but also
examines the change in dollar value of loan activity based on loan-level data versus
aggregate or even bank-level data. These improvements in research methodology are
discussed later in this paper.

Researchers not only provided insight on the impact of government and central
bank policies, but also made recommendations on the most effective focus of credit stimuli
policies. In their examination of policies that affect the banking industry in general and the
role of banks in determining the money supply, Diamond and Dybvig (1986), conclude that
there are certain key provisions that should be included in policies to ensure that banks
perform the valuable services that they are designed to conduct. Those key provisions
include: (1) preserving the ability for banks to create liquidity (i.e. through lending); (2)
retaining the safeguards of deposit insurance; and (3) counteracting the safeguards, such
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as deposit insurance, so that banks do not take on too much risk. Zeltkevic (2009)
suggested that policy makers not aim to merely pressure banks into expanding credit
offerings, but support the industry by unclogging capital markets, providing funds to be
used for lending, and/or engaging in fiscal stimulus that would create a demand for
lending. In addition, Mora (2010) determined that, for banks to be equipped to serve as
liquidity providers in a financial crisis, policy makers would need to take three key
actions. First, policy makers must provide direct interventions into the markets to
increase the supply of credit in general, such as the Commercial Paper Funding Facility
(CPFF) that allowed businesses to issue short-term paper to fund investments. Second,
policy makers need to enhance the supervision and regulation of banks considered “too
big to fail”. Third, policy makers should limit the amount of risk that banks could take in
through loans and other investments. With a focus on lending to small businesses, Cole
(2012) presented policy makers with new insights for policies that will increase business
lending by setting higher capital requirements, reducing the size of the largest banks,
and encouraging the formation of new banks. These policy recommendations from
Diamond and Dybvig (1986), Zeltkevic (2009), Mora (2010), and Cole (2012) cover a
range of areas of which some were addressed to stimulate credit in the United States.

Table 9 provides a “scorecard” of the comparison of the above research-based
recommendations to stimulate credit and the actions taken by the U.S. Federal Reserve
System and government agencies for the same purpose. Upon giving one point for full
adherence to each of the 12 recommendations, the U.S. central bank and agencies earned
8.50 points out of 12 possible points, which equates to a 70.83% score. However, the
credit stimuli implemented by the U.S. included more efforts than those suggested by
researchers.
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[Insert Table 9 here]

Fed Chairman Bernanke (2009) described the programs of the Federal Reserve
System in terms of three sets of tools. The first tool provided access for banks to short
term credit. The second tool provided liquidity directly to borrowers and investors in key
markets to take the pressure off the banks. The third tool involved the purchase of
longer-term securities to reduce long-term rates in support of the housing market.
Similarly, Secretary Geithner (2009) outlined a new Financial Stability Plan that was
designed to (1) revive credit flow, (2) strengthen banks, and (3) make available muchneeded support to homeowners and small businesses. Other agencies of the U.S.
Federal government developed credit stimuli efforts following this same reasoning.

Based on the above review of the existing financial literature and the actions of the
U.S. central bank and government agencies, this paper aims to address the influence
that the $3,543 trillion of U.S. stimulus funds had on commercial lending. More
specifically, I answer the research question of, “Did U.S.-based commercial banks
respond to credit stimuli with increased lending during the stimulus period of October 1,
2007 through September 30, 2011 when compared to the non-stimulus period of October
1, 2002 through September 30, 2006 five years prior”?

Given that the univariate analysis in Chapter 2 shows that lending increased for
the sample of data in the stimulus period compared to the non-stimulus period and the
existing literature did not report on comparative periods outside of the stimulus period, I
hypothesize that the change in commercial lending in the stimulus period will be greater
than commercial lending in the non-stimulus period. The null hypothesis is that lending in
the stimulus period will be less than or equal to commercial lending in the non-stimulus
period based on the credit stimuli offered by the U.S. Federal Reserve System and
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government agencies. If the results show a rejection of the null hypothesis, then lending
increased in the stimulus period and it will appear that commercial banks responded
positively to the credit stimuli. The results will be uncovered through the data and
research methodology.

Data and Methodology
To test this hypothesis, I used loan-level data from the ThomsonOne database.
The 1,977 loans in the stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2011
and 1,844 loans in the non-stimulus period of October 1, 2002 through September 30,
2006 were selected based on dates of funding requests and ultimate approval in the
stated periods. This use of loan-level data and the comparison of time periods five years
apart represent a significant break from most of the existing literature, which generally
either uses aggregate data within the financial crisis time period or includes only a short
interval prior to the crisis. In addition, though Contessi and Francis (2009) state that
actual loan origination data is needed for analysis of the credit activity of commercial
banks, one can agree that this loan-level data provides more detail than summary
balance sheet or aggregate data. In addition, this author believes that the non-stimulus
period represents a valid control period to which to compare the responses of the
lenders to the central bank’s actions during the stimulus period.

The sample of lenders for this study was determined based on the loan-level
data. A lender was included in the sample if it issued at least one loan during both of the
stated periods.

Loan activity in both periods was necessary for the calculation of the

change in lending for each lender. As the database of loans includes both transactions
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by single banks as well as syndicates, any transaction that included a lender included in
the sample was counted as a transaction for that lender even though the other lenders in
the syndicate were excluded from the sample.

However, only the amount of the

transaction to which the U.S.-based lender contributed was counted in the loan activity.
Initially, the sample of lenders included both commercial and non-bank financial
institutions.

To capture the lending activity of the lenders that are U.S.-based commercial
banks, based on the entity’s primary SIC code, I used the National Information Center
(NIC) of the Federal Reserve to identify relationships between entities. Non-commercial
banks were excluded from the sample as well as those with foreign parents. The original
sample of 71 lenders became 45 commercial banks. To ensure the ability to conduct the
event-study analysis for the economic importance of this study, I grouped the 45
commercial banks into the 25 parent companies that serve as the trading entity for the
subsidiary banks. The lending response of the 20 subsidiaries was included with that of
the 25 respective parent banks in both periods of study, regardless of when the
relationship began, to capture comparative total loan-level activity. Table 10 reflects the
summary statistics of the key characteristics of the U.S.-based commercial banks in the
resulting sample.

[Insert Table 10 here]

As shown on Table 10, the 25 U.S.-based commercial banks were separated into
size groupings for this analysis. The size groupings were based on the average of the
annual total assets for the years of the stimulus and non-stimulus period, respectively.
The splits were set to achieve equal numbers of banks in each size category for each
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period to allow for the calculation of the change in lending activity for each bank. The
statistics on participation in stimulus programs relate to the maximum number of stimulus
programs in which the banks in the size grouping participated. Five of the 11 stimulus
programs for which the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury Department made detailed
participation data available are represented in Table 10. The final five programs
included in the testing reflect the removal of six of the 11 programs from the analysis due
to no participation by the sample of banks (i.e. TALF) or high correlation with either the
dependent variable or the other independent variables. The change in the number and
value of loans provides the data for the dependent variable in the regression analysis.

Both regression and event-study analyses were conducted to address the
research question of this chapter. To that end, both forms of analysis were conducted on
six of the eleven programs for which the Federal Reserve or U.S. Treasury Department
released participation details. The programs of analysis include: (1) Asset-Backed
Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF); (2) Commercial
Paper Funding Facility (CPFF); (3) Capital Purchase Program (CPP), the largest bank
program under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP); (4) Supervisory Capital
Assessment Program (SCAP) (also known as “stress tests"); and (5) the Term Auction
Facility (TAF). Table 1 provides a description of each program.

Regression analysis was used to determine the relationship between the change
in the number of loan transactions and value of the loans, as the dependent variables,
and the various independent variables. The dependent variable was calculated to
capture the change in the number and value of the loans, as follows:
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ChginNum jt = Number o f loansstimulus Period -

Num ber o f loansNon_stimulus Period

or

(1)

ChginValjt = Value o f loans ($ m il)stimuius Period —
Value o f loans ($ T^il) Non-stimulus Period

In line with the determination by Gambacorta and Marques-lbanez (2011) that quarterly
data is needed to determine the short-term impact of monetary policy on lending, each
calculation was performed on a quarterly basis with the corresponding quarter five years
prior to the stimulus period date. For example, the number or value of loans signed
during the quarter of October 1, 2007 through December 31, 2007 in the stimulus period
were offset by the number or value of loans signed during the quarter of October 1, 2002
through December 31, 2002 in the non-stimulus period. This pattern continued through
the 16 quarters that ended July 1, 2011 through September 30, 2011, which was offset
by the loan activity during the quarter of July 1, 2006 through September 30, 2006.

The independent variables were selected to maintain the focus on addressing the
research question of, “Was commercial lending in the stimulus period of October 1, 2007
through September 30, 2011 the same as or greater than commercial lending in the non
stimulus period of October 1, 2002 through September 30, 2006 given $3,543 trillion in
total stimuli”?. To that end, the independent variables used in this study reflect the
participation of the sample of banks in the five programs stated above along with the
variable of the change in total deposits to capture the effect of the stimulus action of
increasing the deposit insurance limit. The regression model used is as follows:
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ChginNum.jt
ct; +

or

ChginValjt =

f t AMLFjt + f t CPFFjt + f t CPPjt + /34 SCAPj t +

f t TAFJt

4- (36 C h g in D e p (o rT o ta lD e p )jt +
f t Bank Fixed E ffe c ts + f t Time Fixed E ffe c ts + e;C,

(2)

where ChginNum is the change in the number of loans for the j,h bank during quarter t
and ChginVal is the change in the value of the loans for the jth bank during quarter t; 3 is
a parameter that measures the sensitivity of each independent variable to the dependent
variable. AMLFjt, CPFFjt, CPP program of TARPjt, and TAFjt capture the dollar value of
the bank’s, j, participation in the stated program during the quarter, t. SCAPjt
participation is reflected as a dummy variable during the quarter of the release of the
results as it represents the stress tests that were performed on the 19 largest banks, of
which 11 are in this sample of banks. ChginDepjt or TotalDepjt reflect the level of
deposits of the bank, j, during the quarter, t, as either the change or the total deposits in
the regression. ejt is a random variable that, by construction, must have an expected
value of zero, and is assumed to be uncorrelated with the independent variables.

This methodology also includes attention to the impact of the differences between
the commercial banks and quarterly periods of the sample, as well as the endogenous
nature of the bank lending decision. To address the differences between the commercial
banks, bank fixed effects were included in the regression model. To address the
differences between the quarterly periods, time fixed effects were included in the model.
In following the approach of Berger, Black, Bouwman, and Dlugosz, (2012wp),
endogeneity in the bank lending decision was addressed by lagging the data in each
independent variable by one quarter.
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In addition, regression analysis was conducted based on the bank’s size, as
measured by average total assets as described previously. For that analysis, the sample
was divided into subsets that reflect the banks of each size category. Equation (2) was
then regressed using the change in the number of loans as the dependent variable to
account for the differences in dollar values of funding available based on size. Overall, the
analysis was done to determine the impact of the stimuli on lending based on size of bank.

Event-study analysis was conducted to assess the economic impact on the U.S.
commercial banks around the dates of their participation in and the release of information
on the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury Department’s credit stimuli. The goal of this
analysis was to determine whether the sample of U.S. commercial banks benefited via the
equity markets from the nearly $3.5 to $9 trillion (Isidore, 2010) in credit stimulus that was
made available to eligible institutions. In other words, did the market react positively or
negatively to the participation of banks in the credit stimuli?

Given that information is the driver of market reaction, it must be noted that each of
the 25 U.S. commercial banks in the sample released approximately 3,000 pieces of
information over the period of this study. Such “contagion effects” can lead to biased event
study results in which no specific event can be credited with impacting the market’s
reaction on any given day. However, with this limitation in mind, this event study analyzes
the market’s reaction to the participation, or lack thereof, of the sample banks in the six
credit stimuli programs for which the Federal Reserve or U.S. Treasury Department
released participation details, just as the regression analysis testing, and as shown in
Table 1. In addition, event-study analysis was conducted on those U.S. commercial banks
in the sample that received specific financial support from the Federal Reserve, U.S.
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Treasury, or other government source as a form of credit stimuli. The details of such
support are described in Table 2.

This event study analysis was conducted using an estimation period of 90 days
before the event window of 30 days before and after the event and two models for
comparison of the market’s reaction. The two models are the Market Model and the
Market-adjusted Return Model5. The Market Model is a one-factor statistical model that
assumes that security returns can be explained by the market portfolio’s returns, as
follows:
R jt ~

aj

4" fij Rmt + £jt,

(3)

where Rjt is the rate of return of the common stock of the jth firm on day t; ft is a
parameter that measures the sensitivity of Rjtto the market index. Rmt is the rate of
return of a market index (i.e. S&P 500 index) on day t; ejt is a random variable that, by
construction, must have an expected value of zero, and is assumed to be uncorrelated
with Rmt, uncorrelated with Rk, for k * j, not autocorrelated, and homoskedastic. The
Market Model defines the abnormal return (or prediction error) for the common stock of
the jth firm on day t as:
Aj t

—

R jt

4"

P j R m t)<

(4)

where the coefficients cij and /?j are ordinary least squares estimates of a; and ft. The
average abnormal return (or average prediction error) AARtis the sample mean:

(5)
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where t is defined in trading days relative to the event date. With T , representing 30
trading days before the event and T2 representing 30 days after the event, the
cumulative average abnormal return is:

CAART1T2 = —

'Et=TiAjt.

(6 )

Though the Market Model is most commonly used (MacKinlay, 1997), it can
produce biased results when the events for the firms in the sample are clustered around
similar calendar dates (Seiler, 2004), as are the events of this study. Therefore, results
were also obtained using the Market-Adjusted Return Model for comparative purposes.

The Market-adjusted Return Model is a restricted market model that potentially
reduces some of the bias due to event clustering because it does not require an
estimation period. The restrictions used in this model are that a; is set constant at zero
and 3j is set constant at one given that the estimation period is not used to calculate
normal model parameters (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997). Therefore, marketadjusted returns are computed by subtracting the observed return on the market index
(i.e. S & P 500 Index) for day t, Rmt, from the rate of return of the common stock of the jth

firm on day t:
A jt

=

R jt ~

Rmt

(7)

The definitions of the average abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal
return are the same as those presented above in the Market Model discussion. In
addition, both the Market Model and the Market-adjusted Return Model were used to
calculate the single-date and twin-date mean cumulative abnormal returns.
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The period between the date that the bank participated in one of the six credit
stimuli programs and the date that the Federal Reserve released information on that
participation to the public (i.e. December 1, 2010) is known as “twin dates” in event study
analysis. Twin dates exist for four of the six programs under study, which means that the
information was not released to the public on the dates of the actual transactions. The
date of December 1, 2010 is the release date for the AMLF, CPFF, and TAF programs.
The CPP program of TARP and the SCAP programs released information to the public
on the date of the actual transactions and, therefore, this analysis was only conducted on
the single dates for those two programs. In the twin date analysis, the cumulative
abnormal return was calculated as:

CART1j,T2j =

2^=7! ;• A jt,

(8)

where T^ , T2] are the two event dates specific to firm j and Lj is the length of the event
period in trading days. The cumulative abnormal return for the single and twin date
analysis was used to determine the overall market response to the bank’s participation in
the stated programs.

Analysis of the Data
The results of the regression and event-study analyses are presented in Tables
11 through 16. Tables 11 through 14 capture the results of the regression analysis.
Table 11 shows the impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable of the
number of loan transactions. Table 12 reflects the value of the loans ($ mil) as the
dependent variable. Tables 13 and 14 again use the number of loan transactions as the
dependent variable, but Table 13 splits the sample by size of bank while Table 14 splits
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the sample by the banks that had a decrease or an increase in lending. The data tells
the story of the impact of the credit stimuli on commercial lending and the market’s
reaction.

Based on the dependent variable of the number of loan transactions, the four
models shown in Table 11 capture the significance of the CPFF, CPP program of TARP,
SCAP, and TAF programs, as well as total deposits. In each model, even though model
(1) does not include fixed effects, the four programs show a significant though small impact
on the number of commercial loans issued. SCAP and TAF show negative impact, which
means that the bank’s participation in those programs results in a reduction in the number
of loans issued. It is also clear from Table 11 that the Change in Deposits variable in
model (3) had an insignificant impact on commercial lending, while the Total Deposits
variable in model (4) is significant.

[Insert Table 11 here]

Table 12 reflects the use of the change in the value of the loans ($ mil) as the
dependent variable. In this case, only two programs, SCAP and TAF, are consistently
significant and with negative impact on the value of the loans issued. Again, the Change
in Deposits variable in model (3) is not significant, while the Total Deposits variable in
model (4) is significant even though a very small impact.

[Insert Table 12 here]

When the sample is delineated by the size of the bank, using the change in the
number of loan transactions as the dependent variable, three clear results are seen in
Table 13. First, the small banks did not benefit from the stimuli in their commercial lending
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and faced a decreased in the number of loans issued based on growth in Total Deposits.
It must be noted here that, collectively, the small banks only participated in one of the
stimulus programs, based on Table 10. Second, the medium-sized banks experienced
significant, but small and negative impact from the CPP program of TARP program and
even greater and positive significance from growth in Total Deposits. Third, the large
banks were able to increase commercial lending activity based on the significant result
from participation in the CPFF, Commercial Paper Funding Facility, but not any other
programs or the bank’s own deposits.

[Insert Table 13 here]

Table 14 reflects the regression results using the change in the number of
commercial loans as the dependent variable and splits the sample by the seven banks
who had decreases in lending compared to the 18 banks that had increases in lending.
The results show that the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) of TARP, SCAP, and Total
Deposits significantly influenced those banks that had decreases in lending. However, the
SCAP impact was again negative. Related to the 18 banks that had increases in lending,
the results show that the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), SCAP, TAF, and
Total Deposits significantly influenced their lending.

[Insert Table 14 here]

The event study analysis captured two single dates and one twin period for each
bank’s participation in the stated credit stimuli, as described above. First, I analyzed the
date of the actual loan transaction even though, in three of the five programs in which our
sample of banks participated, the public was not informed of the participation on this date.
Second, the twin period between the date of the actual loan transaction and the date of the
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release of information was analyzed. Third, I analyzed the date of the release of
information only. Table 15 reflects the mean cumulative abnormal returns for this analysis.

[Insert Table 15 here]

On the date of the actual loan transaction, the market reacted in an equal split of
positive and negative significant results based on the Market Model and in a fully positive
significant way based on the Market-adjusted Return Model. The market’s response was
both positive and significant under both models to the banks’ that participated in the AssetBacked Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) and the
Term Auction Facility (TAF). However, the reaction was mixed when banks participated in
the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) in that the Market Model brought forth
negative and significant abnormal returns while the Market-adjusted Model produced a
positive and significant result. The Capital Purchase Program (CPP), the largest bank
program under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), drew a negative reaction from
the market based on the date of the transaction. Under the Market Model, the market had
a significant - 28.9% reaction to the banks that exchanged preferred stock or debt
securities for the capital infusions. For this same program, the report from the Marketadjusted Return Model was that the market had an insignificant, though negative, reaction.
The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) also produced insignificant results
under one model and significant results under the other model. In this case, the Market
Model results are insignificant and the Market-adjusted Return Model reflects positive
cumulative abnormal return of 35.1 % in reaction to the banks’ participation in SCAP or
better known as “stress tests”. Even though three programs (i.e. AMLF, CPFF, and TAF)
did not release information to the public on or near the date of the transactions, the market
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had clear and significant reactions on the banks’ participation in three of the programs (i.e.
AMLF, CPFF, and TAF). With regard to the two programs (i.e. CPP and SCAP) that did
release information to the public on or near the transaction date, the results were split by
significance on one model and insignificance on the other model. A look at the twin-date
analysis could provide more insights as to whether the public knew of the transactions
affected their reaction to the news of a banks’ participation in the credit stimuli.

As reported on Table 15, the event study analysis of the twin-date period show
primarily positive and significant market reaction under both models for the programs in
which our sample of banks participated. Whereas participants in the AMLF program
received positive and significant market reaction under both models, the banks that
participated in the CPFF and TAF programs received negative reaction under the Market
Model and positive and significant reactions under the Market-adjusted Returns Model.
The discrepancy between the models is not determinable, but the significance levels show
that both reactions were strong.

On the dates of the release of the information to the public after the transaction
date, I analyzed the market’s reaction to the participants and the non-participants in the
program. The market’s reaction was positive and significant for both participants and non
participants in all programs. It is interesting to note that, though the program participants
and non-participants got the same positive or negative reaction from the market, the
cumulative abnormal returns of the non-participants are consistently less than that of the
participants in the program on the release date under both models. It appears that there
was an overall greater positive reaction from the market to the participation of the sample
of banks in the general credit stimulus programs than that for non-participants.
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With regard to the specific support that was provided to four of the U.S. commercial
banks in the sample, Table 16 presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns. The
analysis shows primarily insignificant results under both models. Positive and significant
market reaction occurred under the Market Model in response to the Federal Reserve’s
support and approval, respectively, of Citigroup and Wells Fargo in the purchase of
Wachovia. However, negative and significant market reactions surfaced under both
models in reference to the announcement of the joint agreement by the U.S. Treasury
Department and the FDIC to provide non-recourse loans as aid to Bank of America. In
fact, the market spoke loudly in reaction to that aid with mean cumulative abnormal returns
of approximately - 80.00% under both models.

[Insert Table 16 here]

Results and Discussion
Using loan-level data from ThomsonOne of 1,977 loans in the stimulus period
and 1,844 loans in the non-stimulus period, I analyze the 25 U.S.-based commercial
banks that issued commercial loans during both periods.

Through the univariate

analysis, I find that commercial lending increased by $236 billion in the stimulus period
over the non-stimulus period, which reflects a return of 6.75% on the $3,493 trillion
invested by the U.S. Federal Reserve System and government agencies.

The

regression analysis shows significant impact of the credit stimuli on the increase in the
number and/or value of the loan transactions for five of the six credit stimuli studied. In
addition, the event study results show primarily positive and significant market reaction
to the commercial banks’ participation in the credit stimuli. Not only does the increase
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in lending during the stimulus period contribute a new finding to the financial literature,
but also the significant influence of the credit stimuli in the United States sheds new
light on the response of U.S.-based commercial banks.
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CWMPTER 4
THE RESPONSE OF EU-BASED COMMERCIAL BANKS
TO CREDIT STIMULI

Literature Review
The 2008 financial crisis that started in the United States went global as it spread
to the countries of the world. The European Union (EU) was no exception. Of the 27
member countries of the EU as of December 31, 2007 (EU, 2013), France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom, the largest countries of the union, are the focus of this research
as they also represent the highest levels of lending activity in the two comparative
periods. This study of lending in the EU begins with a review of the monetary
relationships of the EU with the three countries of focus (i.e. EU3).

Though each of the member countries has a monetary relationship with the EU,
only 15 of the 27 member countries have adopted the euro as their national currency.
France and Germany, as adopters of the euro as the currency of their country, follow the
monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). Though the ECB sets monetary
policy, the national central banks of France and Germany implement that policy and
perform other roles under the direction of the European System of Central Banks
(ESCB). The United Kingdom (U.K.), though a member of the EU, has not adopted the
euro, but retains the Great Britain pound (GBP) as its national currency and the Bank of
England (BoE) as its central bank for setting monetary policy for the U.K. (ECB, 2008).
Therefore, this research captures the monetary policy actions of the ECB and the BoE.
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Initially, the ECB’s policy response to the 2008 financial crisis was one of crisis
control and mitigation with first steps on the redesign of financial regulation and
supervision. However, it quickly became clear that financial institutions in the member
countries needed financial assistance from guarantees on deposits to specific support to
regain consumer trust in a coordinated effort. (European Commission, 2009). This
coordination developed into broad measures of the ECB such as swap line agreements
with other countries, lowering of key interest rates, and stress tests of financial institution
stability. At the member governmental level, coordinated policy actions took the form of
state guarantees, recapitalization programs, loans, and individual rescue of specific
financial institutions. The Bank of England, in developing monetary policy for the U.K.,
followed a similar model (Petrovic and Tutsch, 2009). It is not yet clear whether or not
how this coordinated effort is offset by the differences in implementation.

Within the EU, Stolz and Wedow (2011) uncovered different approaches to policy
implementation. They found that, while the EU made the acceptance of capital injections
voluntary, the French government, for example, made such injections mandatory. They
also point out that the Members of the EU were split between a focus on addressing the
issues in the broad financial system and attention to the needs of individual financial
institutions. Lastly, Stolz and Wedow (2011) highlight that, within the EU, the limits on
deposit insurance coverage ranged widely. From those findings, it is safe to conclude
that coordination efforts could be enhanced for greater consistency.

In addition, it must be noted that the ECB and BoE implemented quantitative
easing efforts in the form of the purchase of covered bonds and gilt-edged securities (or
government bonds), respectively. Those actions are excluded from the scope of this
research. The specifics of the resulting actions are found in Tables 3 and 4.
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To gain insights into the existing literature on the monetary policy actions of the
ECB, BoE, and the governments of the EU3, this literature review captures the streams
of literature on the approach and the effectiveness of the EU response to the 2008 global
financial crisis. Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2010) look at monetary policies of three central
banks - European Central Bank, Federal Reserve, and Bank of England - and observe
both similarities and differences among the actions of the three institutions. They state
that the key differences between the ECB and other entities is that the ECB already had
a larger balance sheet than the Federal Reserve and the BoE and did not have to
increase its balance sheet to address the elevated demand for central bank liquidity. In
addition, Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2010) state that the ECB dealt primarily with the
banking system while the Federal Reserve dealt with a wide range of counterparties.
Those differences in monetary policy approach could have an impact on its effectiveness
to positively influence bank lending.

With regard to the effectiveness of credit stimuli in the EU on bank lending, I
found existing literature on Germany and the U.K. to provide background for this
analysis. Gern and Jannsen (2009), in their study of whether a credit crunch occurred in
the U.S., Germany, and the Euro area, found that access to credit in Germany was
actually better than in the previous credit crisis and therefore, no credit crunch existed in
Germany during the 2008 global financial crisis. However, Hall (2009) in his analysis of
the U.K.’s January 2009 bank bailout efforts was comparing to the unsuccessful results
of the October 2008 efforts. Based on the components of the package, which includes
government insurance against the failure of “bad banks” and the extension of time limits
on the Credit Guarantee Scheme, to name a few, Hall (2009) concludes that this second
attempt at rescue will also not be effective in increasing lending unless it contains more
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nationalization-style efforts. Bell and Young (2010) further those concerns as they
suggest that the weakness in bank lending in the U.K. is the result of a combination of
tighter credit supply and weaker credit demand. Overall, a mixed message from the EU.

Based on the above review of the existing financial literature and the actions of
the European Central Bank, Bank of England, and governments of the three countries of
study, this chapter addresses the research question of, “Did France-, Germany-, and
United Kingdom-based commercial banks respond to credit stimuli with increased
lending during the stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2011 when
compared to the non-stimulus period of October 1, 2002 through September 30, 2006
five years prior”?

Given that the univariate analysis in Chapter 2 shows that lending increased6
overall for the sample of data in the stimulus period compared to the non-stimulus period
of the EU3 and the existing literature did not report on comparative periods outside of the
stimulus period, I hypothesize that the change in commercial lending in the stimulus period
will be greater than commercial lending in the non-stimulus period. The null hypothesis is
that lending in the stimulus period will be less than or equal to commercial lending in the
non-stimulus period based on the credit stimuli offered by the European Central Bank
(ECB), Bank of England (BoE), and governments of France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom (EU3). If the results show a rejection of the null hypothesis, then lending
increased in the stimulus period and it will appear that commercial banks responded
positively to the credit stimuli. The results will be uncovered through the research
methodology.
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Data and Methodology
To test this hypothesis, I use loan-level data from the ThomsonOne database.
The 754 loans in the stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2011
and 698 loans in the non-stimulus period of October 1, 2002 through September 30,
2006 are those issued by commercial banks based in the European Union countries of
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The loans were selected based on dates of
funding requests and ultimate approval in the stated periods. This use of loan-level data
and the comparison of time periods five years apart represent a significant break from
most of the existing literature, which generally either uses aggregate data within the
financial crisis time period or includes only a short interval prior to the crisis. In addition,
though Contessi and Francis (2009) state that actual loan origination data is needed for
analysis of the credit activity of commercial banks, one can agree that this loan-level
data provides more detail than summary balance sheet or aggregate data. In addition,
this author believes that the non-stimulus period represents a valid control period to
which to compare the responses of the lenders to the central bank’s actions during the
stimulus period.

The sample of lenders for this study was determined based on the loan-level
data. A lender was included in the sample if it issued at least one loan during both of the
stated periods. Loan activity in both periods was necessary for the calculation of the
change in lending for each lender. As the database of loans includes both transactions
by single banks as well as syndicates, any transaction that included a lender included in
the sample was counted as a transaction for that lender even though the other lenders in
the syndicate were excluded from the sample. However, only the amount of the
transaction contributed by the EU-based lender headquartered in France, Germany, or
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UK was counted in the loan activity. Initially, the sample of lenders included both
commercial and non-bank financial institutions.

To capture the lending activity of the lenders that are EU-based commercial
banks, I utilized the entity’s primary SIC code and researched entity trading status and
relationships. Non-publicly traded commercial banks were excluded from the sample as
well as all entities with non-EU parents. The original sample of 32 EU-based lenders
became 19 commercial banks or subsidiaries, which were subsequently grouped into
nine parent commercial banks as the trading entity. The lending response of the 10
subsidiaries was included with that of the nine respective parent banks in both periods of
study, regardless of when the relationship began, to capture comparative total loan-level
activity. Table 17 reflects the summary statistics of the key characteristics of the EU3based commercial banks in the resulting sample.

[Insert Table 17 here]

As shown on Table 17, the nine EU3-based commercial banks were separated
into size groupings for this analysis. The size groupings were based on the average of
the annual total assets for the years of the stimulus and non-stimulus period,
respectively. The splits were set to achieve equal numbers of banks in each size
category for each period to allow for the calculation of the change in lending activity for
each bank. Due to the growth in total assets from the non-stimulus period to the stimulus
period, in which the size of most of the banks doubled, the groupings are different for
each period, as is reflected on Table 17. (NOTE: However, it is coincidental that each
size group has the same number of banks).
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Also shown on Table 17 are statistics on participation in stimulus programs,
number of commercial loan transactions, and the value contributed to the commercial
loan transactions by the banks in the size category. The statistics on participation in
stimulus programs relate to the maximum number of stimulus programs in which the
banks in the size grouping participated. Nine of the credit stimulus programs of the ECB,
BoE, and governments of the EU3 are included in the count of programs on Table 17,
based on the availability of participation details. However, the sample of EU3-based
commercial banks also participated in two U.S. Federal Reserve programs that are
excluded from the analysis in Table 17, but captured in the regression analysis for a
determination of the impact on commercial lending. The change in the number and value
of loans provides the data for the dependent variables in the regression analysis.

Regression analysis was conducted to determine the relationship between
various independent variables and the change in the number of loan transactions and
the change in the value of the bank’s contribution to the loans as the dependent
variables. The dependent variable was calculated to capture the change in the number
and value of the loans, as follows:

ChginNum jt

Nzijjiber o f locLTLS^^irjluiu^ period

Num ber o f locins^/on—stimulus Period

or

(9)

ChginValjt = Value o f loans ($ m il)stimuius Period Value o f loans ($ niiV)^on_Sfimuius period

In line with the determination by Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) that quarterly
data is needed to determine the short-term impact of monetary policy on lending, each
calculation was performed on a quarterly basis with the corresponding quarter five years
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prior to the stimulus period date. For example, change in the number or value of loans
signed during the quarter of October 1, 2007 through December 31, 2007 in the stimulus
period were offset by the number or value of loans signed during the quarter of October
1, 2002 through December 31, 2002 in the non-stimulus period. This pattern continued
through the 16 quarters that ended July 1, 2011 through September 30, 2011, which was
offset by the loan activity during the quarter of July 1, 2006 through September 30, 2006.

The independent variables of the regressions were also captured on a quarterly
basis and reflect the nine ECB, BoE, and government credit stimuli programs as well as
the two U.S. Federal Reserve programs for which participation data was available and
the EU3 commercial banks participated. The nine ECB and EU3 programs of analysis
include one program by the French government, two programs by the German
government, four programs by the UK central bank (i.e. Bank of England) or government,
one program of the ECB; and a measure to capture the increase in deposit insurance
offered by each entity. France offered the injection of subordinated debt capital program,
which is referenced in the regression analysis as “SubDebtFR”. Germany offered a state
guarantee program (GuaranteeWG) and a recapitalization program (RecapWG). The
United Kingdom, through either its separately functioning central bank or government,
offered the following four programs: (1) Capital injection program of UK (Capinject(UK);
(2) Conversion of preferred to common equity program of UK (ConversionUK); (3)
Recapitalization program of United Kingdom (RecapUK); and (4) Special Liquidity
Scheme of UK (SLSUK). Though the ECB offered many programs of general credit
stimuli, the participation of those general programs could not be attributed to individual
banks. Therefore, only the Stress Tests of the ECB (StressTestECB) are included in the
testing as the many of the sample of banks in this study participated in the tests. Lastly,
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Total Deposits are included in the regression analysis as a measure of the effect of the
stimulus action of increasing the deposit insurance limit. The two U.S. Federal Reserve
programs in which the EU3 participated and that are included in the analysis are: (1)
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFFUS) and (2) the Term Auction Facility
(TAFUS). Tables 1, 3, and 4 provide a description of each of the U.S. and EU programs.

The resulting regression model is as follows:

ChginNum jt

or

ChginValjt =

<Xj + /?! Sub Debt FRjt
+ p2 Guar ante eW Gjt +
+

/?3 RecapWG/t + /?4 CapinjectUKjt

p5 ConversionUKjt + /?6 RecapUKjt +

p7 SLSUKjt

+ p8 StressTestECBjt + p9 Total_DepositSjt +
p10 Bank Fixed E ffe c ts + P ^ T im e Fixed E ffe c ts

+ ejt>

(10)

where ChginNum is the change in the number of loan transactions for the jth bank during
quarter t and ChginVal is the change in the value of contribution made to the loan
transactions for the j * bank during quarter t; 3 is a parameter that measures the
sensitivity of each independent variable to the dependent variable. SubDebtFRjt,
GuaranteeWGj,, RecapWGjt, CapinjectUKjt, ConversionUKjt, RecapUKjt, and SLSUKjt
capture the dollar value of the bank’s, j, participation in the stated credit stimuli program
during the quarter, t. StressTestECBjt participation is reflected as a dummy variable
during the quarter of the release of the results as it represents the stress tests that were
performed in the EU by the European Central Bank. Total_Depositsjt reflect the level of
total deposits of the bank, j, during the quarter, t. (NOTE: When only semiannual data
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was provided by a sample bank, the balance of total deposits from the preceding period
was used as the quarterly total. Given the rolling nature of this balance sheet account,
the author does not foresee a material impact of this approach on the regression results).
ejt is a random variable that, by construction, must have an expected value of zero, and
is assumed to be uncorrelated with the independent variables.

This methodology also includes attention to the impact of the differences between
the commercial banks and quarterly periods of the sample, as well as the endogenous
nature of the bank lending decision. To address the differences between the commercial
banks, bank fixed effects were included in the regression model. To address the
differences between the quarterly periods, time fixed effects were included in the model.
In following the approach of Berger, Black, Bouwman, and Dlugosz, (2012wp),
endogeneity in the bank lending decision was addressed by lagging the data in each
independent variable by one quarter.

After the initial regression analysis was conducted on the impact of the nine ECB
and EU3 credit stimuli, it was determined that the GuaranteeWG and RecapWG
programs of Germany were highly correlated with the other variables and resulted in
biased results. Therefore, those programs were removed from the analysis and the
results were reproduced without bias. The modified regression model is as follows:

ChginNurrijt
ccj +
R ecapUKjt +

or

C hginValjt =

SubDebtFRJt + /?2 CapinjectUKjt +

/?3 ConversionUKjt +

fis SLSUKjt + /?6 StressTestECB + (37 Total_D epositS jt +

Bank Fixed E ffe c ts +

/?9 Time Fixed E ffe c ts + €jt

(11)
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To determine the impact on commercial lending based on the participation of the
EU3 in the two U.S. Federal Reserve credit stimuli programs, the regression model was
modified to include those programs, as follows:

ChginNunijt
a.j +

/?! SubDebtFRjt 44- /?4 RecapUKjt 4-

or

ChginValjt =

CapinjectUKjt 4- /?3 ConversionUKjt
/?5 SLSUKj, + /?6 StressTestECB

4- /?7 Total_DepositSjt + /?8 CPFFUSjt +

TAFUSjt

+ /?9 Bank Fixed E ffe c ts + /?10 Time Fixed E ffe c ts + €jt>

(12)

In addition, regression analysis was conducted on other bases and stock price
trends were reviewed as part of the testing. Using Equation (12), I conducted regressions
of the sample of commercial banks split by size and by decreases versus increases in the
number of loan transactions. I also charted the stock price trend during the stimulus period
for a visual of the market’s reaction to the EU3-based commercial banks. Overall, the
analysis was done to determine the impact of the credit stimuli on commercial lending from
various perspectives.

Analysis of the Data
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Tables 18 through 20.
Table 18 shows the impact of the credit stimuli independent variables on the dependent
variables of the change in the number of loan transactions, in columns (1) and (2) and
the change in the value of the bank’s contribution to the loan transaction in columns (3)
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and (4). Tables 19 and 20 again use the change in the number of loan transactions as
the dependent variable, but Table 19 splits the sample by size of bank, while Table 20
splits the sample by the banks that had a decrease or an increase as the change in
lending. The data tells the story of the impact of the credit stimuli on commercial lending.

In Table 18, the participation of the sample of banks in ECB and/or EU3 credit
stimuli is complemented by participation in U.S. Federal Reserve credit stimuli programs.
In columns (1) and (3) of Table 18, only the ECB and EU3 credit stimuli programs are
captured as independent variables. The dependent variables are the change in the
number of loan transaction in column (1) and the change in the value in column (3). In
columns (2) and (4) of Table 18, the two U.S. Federal Reserve credit stimuli programs
are added to the model to determine if there is any change in impact. However, the only
independent variable of significance in all four of the models is the SLSUK (or the
Special Liquidity Scheme of the UK), which provided $1.2 trillion of liquidity to two of the
banks in the sample. This author reasons that such a substantial boost to liquidity
contributed to the increase in commercial lending for the two participating commercial
banks. One point of note is that when ChginNum is the dependent variable (i.e. in
columns (1) and (2)), SLSUK is significant at the 5% level. On the other hand, when
ChginVal is the dependent variable (i.e. in columns (3) and (4)), SLSUK is significant at
the 10% level, but with a higher impact based on the coefficient on the variable. The
results on Table 18 reflect the full sample of the data and the only significance.

[Insert Table 18 here]
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When the data is split into smaller samples, as in Tables 19 and 20, the result is
that none of the credit stimulus programs shows any significant impact on the dependent
variable of the change in the number of loan transactions. In Table 19, the sample is
split into size groupings of small, medium, and large based on the total assets ranges
shown in Table 17. In Table 20, the sample is split based on whether the change in the
number of loan transactions was a decrease or an increase. Not only is there no
significance among the independent variables, but also correlation issues resulted in the
removal of certain variables from the model. Those models are marked as “n/a” in the
table. Overall, the increase in commercial lending in the three countries of the European
Union is not in response to the credit stimuli of neither the ECB and/or EU3 nor the U.S.

[Insert Table 19 here]

[Insert Table 20 here]

With no significance in the regression analysis, I sought to determine if the
market had a positive or negative reaction to the sample banks’ based on changes in the
stock price. Though event-study analysis would provide more information, none is
performed due to the reality of insignificance in the regressions. However, Figure 10
provides graphic verification that the market seemingly had a negative reaction to the
sample of banks during the stimulus period.

[Insert Figure 10 here]
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Results and Discussion
Based on the results of this chapter, I find that my hypothesis is not supported.
Commercial lending in the stimulus period was greater than that of the non-stimulus
period, as shown in Table 17. However, Tables 18 through 20 show that the portion of the
$4,286 trillion in credit stimuli tested in this research did not contribute to that increase in
commercial lending. Though the Special Liquidity Scheme of the UK (SLSUK) showed
significance in Table 18, the other eight credit stimuli tested were insignificant in impact on
either of the dependent variables related to the increase in commercial lending. The
approach of the ECB and EU3 to the distribution of the credit stimuli could be a factor.
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CHAPTER

5

CONCLUSION

This dissertation called upon the theory of financial intermediation (Diamond and
Dybvig, 1983) and the credit channel theory of monetary policy effectiveness (Bernanke
and Gertler, 1995) to show how commercial banks responded to the trillions of dollars of
innovations offered by central banks and governments to stimulate the credit markets
during the 2008 global financial crisis. Therefore, building on the approaches used in
existing literature, I used loan-level data of commercial lending and conduct univariate,
regression, and event-study analyses to address the research question of, “Did United
States- and European Union-based commercial banks respond to credit stimuli with
increased commercial lending during the stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through
September 30, 2011 when compared to the non-stimulus period of October 1, 2002
through September 30, 2006 five years prior?” In a comparison of the stimulus and non
stimulus periods, the univariate analysis revealed that total commercial loan demand
decreased by 3.5% in quantity, but increased by 2.2% in dollar value. In addition, total
commercial loan supply increased by 17% in quantity and by 35% in dollar value in the
same period-to-period comparison. However, further analysis answered the research
question on whether or not this increase in commercial loan supply was in response to
the credit stimuli.
With regard to the theoretical foundation of this research, as presented in
Chapter 2, the results vary by geographic region. In the U.S., the commercial banks did
fulfill their role as creators of liquidity with demand deposits, which showed significant
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regression results, as the theory of financial intermediation states (Diamond and
Dybvig, 1983). However, deposits were not a significant factor of the increased
commercial lending for the EU-based commercial banks. In relation to the bank lending
channel component of the credit channel theory of monetary policy effectiveness
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1995), the existence of the channel was dependent upon finding
increases in economic output, bank lending, and bank security holdings as a result of
expansionary monetary policy (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992). This research specifically
addressed the increase in bank lending as evidence of the effectiveness of the bank
lending channel. With that view, the bank lending channel was effective in the U.S. as
the findings show significance for the influence of credit stimuli (i.e. monetary policy) on
the increase in commercial lending. However, the effectiveness of monetary policy on
the bank lending channel in the EU3 (i.e. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) is
not seen as no significance was found in the credit stimuli in relation to the increase in
commercial lending in the three countries of the EU. Future research will examine other
factors that might have influenced the increase in commercial lending in the stimulus
period over the non-stimulus period in the European Union. The results of this research
show that both theories were in operation for the United States-based commercial
banks during the 2008 global financial crisis.

In Chapter 3 , 1examined the response of United States-based commercial banks
to the credit stimuli introduced by the United States (U.S.) Federal Reserve System and
agencies of the Federal government. Using loan-level data from ThomsonOne of 1,977
loans in the stimulus period and 1,844 loans in the non-stimulus period, I analyzed the
25 U.S.-based commercial banks that issued commercial loans during both periods.
Through the univariate analysis, I found that commercial lending increased by $236
billion in the stimulus period over the non-stimulus period, which reflects a return of
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6.75% on the $3,493 trillion invested by the U.S. Federal Reserve System and
government agencies. The regression analysis showed significant impact of the credit
stimuli on the increase in the number and/or value of the loan transactions for five of the
six credit stimuli studied. In addition, the event study results showed primarily positive
and significant market reaction to the commercial banks’ participation in the credit
stimuli. Not only does the increase in lending during the stimulus period contribute a
new finding to the financial literature, but also the significant influence of the credit
stimuli in the United States shed new light on the response of U.S.-based commercial
banks.

In Chapter 4 , 1 conducted loan-level analysis on 754 commercial loans in the
stimulus period and 698 commercial loans in the non-stimulus period issued by nine
commercial banks based in the European Union (EU) countries of France, Germany, and
the United Kingdom (U.K.) (referred to collectively as “EU3”). Through the univariate
analysis, I found that commercial lending increased by $18 billion in the stimulus period
over the non-stimulus period, which reflects a return of 0.42% on the $4,286 trillion
invested by the European Central Bank, Bank of England, and the governments of each
of the three countries of analysis. However, the regression analysis reported a lack of
significance in eight of the nine stimulus programs studied. Significant results were
obtained for the Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) offered by the U.K., which provided $1.2
trillion of liquidity to two of the banks in the sample. This author reasons that such a
substantial boost to liquidity contributed to the increase in commercial lending for the two
participating commercial banks. However, the overall increase in commercial lending in
the three countries of the European Union is not in response to the credit stimuli.
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Based on the stated research results, I conclude that the effectiveness of the
credit stimuli in the U.S. versus the ineffectiveness of that of the EU could relate to the
approach of each region with regard to the adjustment of key interest rates and the
breadth and depth of the financial institutions reached with the stimuli. The reduction of
the spread in the key interest rates of the U.S. started in Augusto 2007 and went as low
as 25 basis points from its 100 basis-point pre-crisis level. However, adjustments by the
European Central Banks (ECB) to the key rates in the EU started in October 2008 and
did not change its spread between the rates at any time. In addition, in the U.S., credit
stimuli were provided broadly with more general eligibility to financial institutions with
various reaches into the capital markets than in the EU, which focused much of its stimuli
funds on specific financial institutions. Many of those specific financial institutions of the
EU were not commercial banks during the period of this study or did not make
commercial loans during both the stimulus and non-stimulus periods. Therefore, those
financial institutions are excluded from this research and the benefit that they might have
gained from the credit stimuli of the EU is not captured. In the end, the specific approach
of the EU did not have a significant influence on commercial lending, while the broad
approach of the United States to credit stimuli did have a significant influence on U.S.based commercial banks.

Other differences between US-, and EU-, based banks could have led to these
research results. Using data from over 80 countries, Aisen and Franken (2010), found
that regions with trading partners with lower GDP growth, certain structural
characteristics, and use of counter-cyclical monetary policy had the greatest impact on
lending during the crisis. Claessens, Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven (2010) also
performed cross-country research in their look at 58 advanced countries and emerging
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markets and observed that the crisis hit the U.S. in a clear timeline while other countries
experienced a less clear start on the impact of the crisis and, therefore, a later reaction
occurred. They add that the delayed response, financial liberalization in many countries,
and underpriced deposit insurance led to greater risk-taking by the banks. In addition,
Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2010) and Stolz and Wedow (2010) state that the ECB dealt
primarily with the banking system while the Federal Reserve dealt with a wide range of
counterparties. Zhang (2013) states that the undercapitalization of EU banks compared
to US banks has been and remains a problem. Though the stated factors were not
tested in this research, it is important to note other reasons why the U.S. and EU results
might have differed.

Overall, these results open the door to more questions that will require future
research. First, future research is needed to answer the question of, “Did the financial
institutions throughout the European Union that received targeted credit stimuli respond
with increased lending?” Second, this author is curious about the approach to credit
stimuli distribution and the lending response used in other countries, such as Canada,
Australia, and Japan, as examples of countries with high levels of commercial lending.
Third, given that the programs of Quantitative Easing and Operation Twist were excluded
from this study, future research will explore whether or not those programs had the
anticipated negative effect on commercial lending. Lastly, in their study of lending of
activity from 1999:Q1 through 2008:Q4, Contessi and Francis (2009) conclude that credit
issued by the entire population of regulated commercial banks contracted more than it
expanded. However, they qualify their conclusions with the reality that their measures of
loan activity for 2008 may have shown different results if affected by the programs
implemented by the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury. That statement leads one to an

idea for further research about the counterfactual impact of monetary policy actions. In
keeping with Contessi and Francis’ (2009) view, further research will answer the research
question of, “What might have been the lending status without the credit stimuli of the
central banks and governments?” These research questions will be answered through
the validity of empirical research.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: Summary of U.S. Credit Stimuli, by date
To stimulate financial institutions to exercise their financial intermediary role in the
economy, the Federal Reserve System and the U.S. Department of Treasury offered
the listed 20 programs during the period of August 17, 2007 through September 30,
2011. Multiple actions were taken under most programs. Some stimulus programs
continued through December 2012 and beyond.
SOURCE: http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/global_economy/Crisis_Timeline.pdf

Name of Program

Date of First
Action

Number of
Subsequent
Actions

Reduction of Spread
between Key
Lending Rates

August 17,
2007

7

Lowering of Target
Federal Funds Rate

September 18,
2007

25

Term Auction
Facility (TAF)

December 12,
2007

Swap Line
Agreements

December 12,
2007 (for
liquidity lines)
and
April 6, 2009
(for foreign
currency
agreements)

Program Description
and/or Status
Primary credit discount window
rate reduced from 6.25% to 5.75%,
which resulted in a spread of 50
basis points with the Federal
Funds rate. That spread was
maintained throughout the financial
crisis.
Target range of Federal Funds
Rate initially reduced from 5.25%
to 4.75%. By 2008, the range was
set at 0.00% to 0.25% and was
maintained at that level.

13

First auction took place for $20 bn
of 28-day credit. In Feb 2008,
auctions increased to $30 bn every
two weeks and with longer terms.
84-day credit increased to $75 bn.
Overall, TAF funding increased to
$900 bn.

14

Swap lines and agreements were
opened with the European Central
Bank ($210 bn+), Swiss National
Bank ($7 bn+), Bank of Australia,
Sverige Rilksbank, Norges Bank,
Bank of Japan (no cap), Brazil ($30
bn), Mexico ($30 bn), Korea ($30
bn), and Singapore ($30 bn). In
September 2009, total swap lines
doubled to $620 bn.
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Table 1: Continued
Name of Program

Troubled Asset
Relief Program
(TARP)/ Capital
Purchase Program
(CPP)

Term Securities
Lending Facility
(TSLF)/TSLF
Options Program
(TOP)

Primary Dealer
Credit Facility
(PDCF)

Asset-Backed
Commercial Paper
Money Market
Mutual Fund
Liquidity Facility
(AMLF)

Date of First
Action

February 13,
2008
(and
October 3,
2008)

March 11,
2008

March 16,
2008

September 19,
2008

Number of
Subsequent
Actions

Program Description
and/or Status

2

In execution of the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,
TARP was funded with $700 bn
total. An estimated $331 bn was
made available to commercial
banks with the Treasury Department
using $250 billion to purchase
senior preferred shares of financial
institutions under the Capital
Purchase Program (CPP)

5

This weekly auction program was
funded to lend up to $200 bn of
Treasury securities, as well as
options to draw upon TSLF loans, to
primary dealers secured by other
securities for a term of 28 days
rather than overnight. Program
closed on February 1, 2010.

2

PDCF offered overnight loans that
totaled about $9 bn to primary
dealers to provide liquidity in the
market for U.S. Treasury securities.
Program closed on February 1,
2010

1

This program allowed eligible
financial institutions to borrow $217
bn in funds to purchase assetbacked commercial paper to restore
liquidity to that market. Program
closed on February 1, 2010.
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Table 1: Continued
Name of Program

Interest Payments
on Required and
Excess Reserves

Commercial Paper
Funding Facility
(CPFF)

Temporary Liquidity
Guarantee Program

Change in the
Definition of Tier 1
capital

Date of First
Action

October 6,
2008

October 7,
2008

October 14,
2008

October 15,
2008

Number of
Subsequent
Actions

Program Description
and/or Status

3

Interest was paid on average
required reserve balances and
average excess balances
maintained over a reserve
maintenance period. Rate paid on
excess reserves started at 75 basis
points less than the targeted federal
funds rate. Rate increased by
0.40% later in October 2008 and
again in November 2008.

0

Through a special purpose vehicle
(SPV), this facility was funded with
$2.3 trillion to purchase three-month
unsecured and asset-backed
commercial paper directly from
eligible issuers. Program closed on
February 1,2010.

0

Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) provides
insurance on newly issued senior
unsecured debt of eligible financial
institutions and full coverage of non
interest bearing deposit transaction
accounts, regardless of dollar
amount. Program closed on
October 31,2009.

0

Definition changed to include in
Tier 1 capital the $250 bn of senior
preferred shares purchased under
the Treasury Department's Capital
Purchase Program through TARP.
SOURCE:
http://www.federal reserve .gov/news
events/press/bcreg/20081020a.htm
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Table 1: Continued
Name of Program

Money Market
Investor Funding
Facility (MMIFF)

Agency MortgageBacked Securities
(MBS) Program

Term Asset-Backed
Securities Loan
Facility (TALF)

Supervisory Capital
Assessment
Program (SCAP)
(also referred to as
"stress tests”)

Date of First
Action

October 21,
2008

November
2008

November 25,
2008

February 23,
2009

Number of
Subsequent
Actions

Program Description
and/or Status

0

A maximum amount of $600 bn was
made available to special purpose
vehicles to purchase certain money
market instruments from eligible
institutions. The Federal Reserve
provided 90% of the funding and the
private sector provided 10%.
SOURCE:
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/
mmiff_faq.html

2

The low target for the Federal Funds
rate led the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) to expand its
holdings of mortgage-backed
securities guaranteed by Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae.
$1.25 trillion in agency MBS were
purchased

8

TALF provided loans initially
collateralized only by AAA assetbacked securities and later accepted
a wider range of collateral. This
program was jointly conducted with
the Department of Treasury, which
used TARP funds for its
participation. Total of $1 trillion was
set aside for the program.

2

In a joint effort conducted by the
Federal Reserve and four
governmental agencies, an
assessment of the capital status of
19 of the largest bank holding
companies (BHCs) was conducted
to determine the need for capital
infusions. Ten of the 19 BHCs
needed capital. Only one of the 10
needed government capital. The
other nine obtained private capital.
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Table 1: Continued
Name of Program

Redemption of
Treasury Capital

Date of First
Action

June 1,2009

Legacy Securities
Public-Private
Investment Program
(PPIP)

July 8, 2009

Term Deposit Facility
(TDF)

May 10, 2010
(NOTE: Reg
D was
amended on
December 28,
2009)

Changes in FDIC
Deposit Insurance
Coverage Issued

July 21, 2010

Number of
Subsequent
Actions

Program Description
and/or Status

0

The 19 BHCs that participated in
SCAP were allowed to redeem the
U.S. Treasury capital with certain
considerations in place. This
"stock buy-back" was approved if,
for example, the BHC could prove
that it could continue to perform its
intermediary role.

0

The Treasury Department
committed $22.1 bn and partnered
with nine PPIFs in the private
sector to put capital back into the
market for legacy securities. The
goal of PPIP was to help financial
institutions begin to remove these
assets from their balance sheets so
that funds could be re-deploy as
new credit to households and
businesses.

13

With maturities extended to as long
as 84 days, term deposits allowed
eligible institutions to participate in
a series of small-value auctions of
$1 bn to $5 bn of term deposits.
This program has been continued
beyond the scope of this study.

2

After the July 2010 signing of the
Dodd-Frank Act, the FDIC
permanently raised the maximum
deposit insurance amount to
$250,000 per depositor, per
institution. On November 9, 2010,
a ruling allowed for unlimited
insurance coverage of noninterestbearing transaction accounts
beginning December 31, 2010
through December 31, 2012.
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Table 2: Summary of U.S. Credit Stimuli to Specific Financial Institutions,
by date
Given the potential impact on the financial markets if certain financial institutions failed, the
Federal Reserve and other government departments provided specific credit stimuli. This
table summarizes the financial institutions that benefited from those targeted programs.
SOURCE: http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/global_economy/Crisis_Timeline.pdf

Financial institution

Description of Action

Date of First
Action

J.P. Morgan

Approved purchase of Bear Stearns

March 14, 2008

Bank of America

Approved purchase of Countrywide

June 5, 2008
September 21,
2008

Goldman Sach (GS)

Approved as a bank holding company

Morgan Stanley (MS)

Approved as a bank holding company

September 21,
2008

Merrill Lynch

Authorized lending to Merrill Lynch at the
primary credit rate

September 21,
2008

Agreed to provide liquidity to aid in the
Wachovia purchase (NOTE: Wells Fargo
ultimately purchased Wachovia).

September 29,
2008

Citigroup

Wells Fargo

Bank of America

Approved purchase of Wachovia. (NOTE:
Wells Fargo's offer was chosen by Wachovia
over that of Citigroup).

Agreed jointly with Treasury and FDIC to
provide non-recourse loan as aid

October 12,
2008

January 16,
2009
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Table 3: Summary of EU Credit Stimuli, by date
To stimulate financial institutions to exercise their financial intermediary role in the economy,
the European Central Bank, the governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom,
as well as the Bank of England, offered the listed 27 credit stimuli programs during the period
of August 17, 2007 through September 30, 2011. Multiple actions were taken under most
programs. Some stimulus programs continued through December 2012 and beyond. Panel A
captures the credit stimulus actions of the European Central Bank. Panel B reflects the
actions taken by the government of France. Panel C presents the actions of the government
of Germany. Panel D shows the actions taken by the Bank of England and the government of
the U.K., which has not adopted the euro as its national currency. Conversion into U.S. dollars
is based on the exchange rate in place on the day of the first action of the program.
SOURCE:
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/global_economy/IRCTimelinePublic.pdf and
Petrovic and Tutsch (2009)

Panel A - European Central Bank Credit Stimuli, by date
Number of
Subsequent
Actions

Program Description
and/or Status

7

Established initial swap lines
agreements of $20 bn with the
U.S. Federal Reserve. Line
values were uncapped in
October 2008. Lines closed in
February 2009. Foreign
currency agreements were
opened in April 2009.

October 8, 2008

12

Cut deposit facility and
marginal lending facility rates
by 50 bp. Cut main refinancing
operations rate October 15,
2008. Subsequent actions
continued through December
14, 2011 when all three rates
were set at record lows.

December 31,2009

2

Conducted Stress tests in May
2009 and September 2009

Name of Program

Date of First Action

Swap Line
Agreements

December 12, 2007
(for liquidity lines)
and
April 6, 2009 (for
foreign currency
agreements)

Lowering of Key
Interest Rates

Stress Tests
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Table 3: Continued
Panel B - [Government of ] France Credit Stimuli, by date

Name of Program

Date of First Action

Number of
Subsequent
Actions

Program Description
and/or Status

State Guarantee
Refinancing
Scheme

October 18, 2008

1

Made €360 bn (or $491 bn)
available in debt security
guarantees and
recapitalizations.

Loans to Banks

October 20, 2008

0

Announced a fund of €320 bn
(or $426 bn) to provide loans to
banks and other financial firms

Panel C - [Government of] Germany Credit Stimuli, by date

Name of Program

Acquisition of
impaired assets

State Guarantee
Scheme

Recapitalization
measures

Date of First Action

October 13, 2008

October 18, 2008

December 31, 2009

Number of
Subsequent
Actions

Program Description
and/or Status

0

Purchased or acquired risk
positions of eligible institutions
up to €10 bn per entity.
Maximum is €80 bn (or $109
bn) total commitment

0

Provided guarantees for debt
securities of eligible financial
institutions up to €400 bn (or
$537 bn) in total.

0

Provided a maximum of €10 bn
per eligible institution at
interest rates of 7 to 9%.
Program maximum
commitment is €80 bn (or $115
bn)

82

Table 3: Continued
Panel D - Bank of England Credit Stimuli for United Kingdom, by date

Name of Program

Increased
Deposit
Insurance
Coverage

Government
Recapitalization
Scheme (GRS)

Credit Guarantee
Scheme

Asset Protection
Scheme

Swap Line
Agreements

Date of First Action

October 3, 2008

October 8, 2008

October 13, 2008

January 19, 2009

April 6, 2009

Number of
Subsequent
Actions

Program Description
and/or Status

0

Financial Services Authority
increased deposit insurance
coverage from £35,000
to £50,000

0

Made funds available for all
banks to raise Tier 1 capital by
£25 bn (or $43.2 bn) combined
to eligible institutions

2

Guaranteed debt of short-term
maturity with fund of £250 bn
(or $436 bn). Later extended
scheme to continue through
April 2014.

5

1

Announced that, for a fee, Her
Majesty’s (HM) Treasury will
insure risky debt held by banks
up to £200 bn (or $295 bn) in
total.

Established swap line
agreement with U.S. Federal
Reserve System. Allowed
lines to expire on February 1,
2010.
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Table 4: Summary of EU Credit Stimuli to Specific Financial Institutions,
by date
Given the potential impact on the financial markets if certain financial institutions failed, the
European Central Bank, Banque de France, and/or Bank of England provided specific credit
stimuli. This table summarizes the financial institutions that benefited from those targeted
programs. Conversion into U.S. dollars is based on the exchange rate in place on the day of
the first action of the program.

SOURCE: http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/globaLeconomy/IRCTimelinePublic.pdf and
Petrovic and Tutsch (2009)

Panel A - France Credit Stimuli to Specific Financial Institutions, by date

Financial Institution

Description of Program

Date of First
Action

Dexia

Guaranteed 36.5% of €150 bn, which
is an amount of €54.8 bn (or $74 bn) to
refinance the bank in a joint agreement
with Belgium (60.5%) and Luxembourg
(3%).

October 9,
2008

BNP Paribas SA
Credit
Agricole SA
Societe
Generate SA
Credit Mutuel
Caisse d'Epargne
Banque
Populaire

Injected €21.5 bn (or $27 bn) in
subordinated debt capital for the stated
six largest banks of France, with €10.5
bn authorized in December 2008 and
€10.5 bn in January 2009

December
2008

Dexia

Granted another guarantee of €4.5 bn
(or $6.4 bn) related to past losses

January 1,
2009

Groupe Banque Populaire and
Groupe Caisse d’Epargne

Government provided €5 bn (or $6.4
bn) in debt and preference shares to
support the merger of the two entities

February 26,
2009
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Table 4: Continued
Panel B - Germany Credit Stimuli to Specific Financial Institutions, by date
Financial Institution

Description of Program

Aareal Bank
BayernLB
Commerzbank AG
HSH Nordbank
Hypo Real Estate
IKB
Sicherungseinrichtungsgesellschaft
Deutscher Banken (SdB)
Sachsen LB
NordLB

Provided guarantees under the State
Guarantee Scheme to specific
financial institutions. Commerzbank
AG, a sample bank in this study,
received €15 bn (or $20.135bn)

Aareal Bank
Commerzbank AG
HSH Nordbank

Provided recapitalization funds to
specific financial institutions.
Commerzbank AG, a sample bank in
this study, received €18.2 bn (or
$24.43bn)

Date of First
Action

October 18,
2008

October 18,
2008
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Table 4: Continued
Panel C - United Kingdom Credit Stimuli to Specific Financial Institutions,
by date
Financial Institution

Description of Program

Date of First
Action

Northern Rock

Government provided £27 bn in
emergency loans and £30 bn (or $112
bn total) in guarantees before
nationalizing the bank on February 21,
2008

February 17,
2008

Under the Bank of England’s Special
Liquidity Scheme, allowed two banks
to swap high-quality securities for UK
Treasury bills for up to three years.
Lloyds was allowed £325 bn (or $645
bn) and RBS was allowed £260 bn (or
$515 bn) in swaps

April 13, 2008

Government nationalized the bank by
selling it to Abbey National (a sub of
Grupo Santander)

September 27,
2008

Made funds available for all banks to
raise Tier 1 capital by £25 bn (or $43.2
bn) combined to eight financial
institutions under the Government
Recapitalization Scheme

October 8,
2008

Lloyds Banking Group
Royal Bank of Scotland

Bradford & Bingley

Abbey National PLC
Barclays Bank PLC
HBOS
HSBC Bank PLC
Lloyds TSB Bank PLC
Nationwide Society
Royal Bank of Scotland
Standard Chartered
HBOS/Lloyds
Royal Bank of Scotland

Government made capital injections
totaling £37 bn (or $54.4 bn)

January 16,
2009

Royal Bank of Scotland

HM Treasury converted preference
shares into common equity with an
investment of £5 bn (or $7.4 bn)

January 19,
2009

Royal Bank of Scotland

Government provided capital injection
of £13 bn (or $18.6 bn) in exchange for
84% ownership

February 26,
2009

Lloyds

HM Treasury converted preference
shares into common equity

March 7, 2009
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Table 5: Summary of Coverage by Financial Media
Using the LexisNexis news database to search on terms of credit stimuli, bank lending,
countries of study, Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of England, and other
related words, The media articles listed below reflect a representative and random sample of
the coverage of credit stimuli efforts and the media’s impression of the response of banks
during 2008 through 2011. Articles with titles that named specific banks were intentionally
excluded. The articles are listed by date to show the progression of the media’s
interpretations.

Date

Author

Title

Financial Media
Outlet

May 10, 2008

Seib, C.

ECB report shows tighter credit conditions
across eurozone

October 7,
2008

(none stated)

Europe's leaders fail crucial test

The Times
(London)
Australian
Financial
Review

October 14,
2008

(none stated)

Global Bailout: Major governments at last
embrace a common strategy for rescuing
the international financial system

The Washington
Post

October 14,
2008

Fleming, S. &
Harper, J.

Wall Street bounces back: Bank rescue
calms markets FTSE 100 up 325 points;
Dow soars 936 points

Daily Mail
(London)

October 14,
2008

Landler, M.

U.S. Investing $250 billion to bolster
banks; Dow Surges 936 points

The New York
Times

October 15,
2008

Landler, M.

Bush outlines plan to invest in banks:
U.S. to spend up to $250 billion in biggest
intervention since 1930s

The International
Herald Tribune

October 21,
2008

Kennedy, S.

French banks rally after $14 billion capital
boost

MarketWatch.co
m

November 1,
2008

(none stated)

Recession looms amid frenzied rescue
efforts

The Banker

November
24,2008

Pittman, M. &
Ivry, B.

U.S. Pledges Top $7.7 Trillion to Ease
Frozen Credit (Table)

Bloomberg

December
11,2008

Braude, J.

U.K. proposes new stimulus

Daily Deal/The
Deal
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Table 5: Continued

Author

February 24,
2009

Pittman, M. &
Ivry, B.

U.S. Bailout, Stimulus Pledges Total
$11.6 Trillion (Table)

Bloomberg

March 2009

(none stated)

Whopping Total of Economic Stimulus
Packages

Stimulus
Package
Details.com

May 22, 2009

Monaghan,
A.

BoE sees little sign of policy success as
lending slows

The Daily
Telegraph
(London)

July 8, 2009

Brown, G.

Chiefs in plea to Bank of England on
lending; Economy

Birmingham Post

July 21, 2009

Elliott, L.

£125 bn boost for banks fails to jump-start
business lending

The Guardian
(London)

August 5,
2009

Seager, A.

Bank loans to businesses drop by £14.7
bn

The Guardian
(London)

November
16, 2009

Goldman, D.

CNNMoney.com's bailout tracker

CNN Money

January 8,
2010

Gandel, S.

Bank Lending is Still Down. Should We
Be Worried?

Time

Inman, P.

Banks fear for their recovery, says CBI:
Business group's survey sees lending
likely to fail...

The Guardian
(London)

(none stated)

Not Easy: The Bank of England is right to
halt its injection of huge sums into the
economy

The Times
(London)

Crowe, D.

Central banks to plan tougher controls

Australian
Financial Review

January 11,
2010

February 5,
2010
February 8,
2010

Title

Financial Media
Outlet

Date

Table 5: Continued

Date

Author

Title

Financial Media
Outlet

February 17,
2010

EvansPritchard, A.

US bank lending falls at fastest rate in
history

The Telegraph

February 19,
2010

Gilmore, G.

Record fall in bank lending to business
triggers new conven over UK recovery

The Times
(London)

August 4,
2010

Groves, J. &
Duke S.

Our Booming Banks Have to Lend Again,
says Cameron

Daily Mail
(London)

August 10,
2010

Wilson, H.

Lending to UK business falls £30bn

The Daily
Telegraph
(London)

August 18,
2010

Delta, S.

Big Banks Loosen Lending Standards:
Does it Matter

Seeking Alpha

October 26,
2010

Armistead, L.

Cameron vows to spur bank lending

The Daily
Telegraph
(London)

November
2010

Hall, P.

Big banks - Turning the corner?

Trade Finance

November 9,
2010

Harding, R.

U.S. banks see demand for business
loans drop

Financial Times

December 1,
2010

Isidore, C.

Fed made $9 trillion in emergency
overnight loans

CNN Money

March 31,
2011

Applebaum,
B. & McGinty,
J.

The Fed's Crisis Lending: A Billion Here,
a Thousand There

The New York
Times

April 7, 2011

Christie, R.

Back of the Envelope Accounting for the
Bailout

Bloomberg
BusinessWeek
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Table 5: Continued

Date

Author

Title

Financial Media
Outlet

May 2, 2011

Matthews, S.
& Zumbrun,
J.

Fed Says Banks Eased Lending Terms,
Demand for Loans Rose

Bloomberg
BusinessWeek

May 24, 2011

Davison, J.

Plea from firms as banks miss targets

Evening Gazette

June 14,
2011

Recap, R.

U.S. Commercial Lending Continues to
Lag Demand as Banks Recover Slowly

Seeking Alpha

August 7,
2011

Oakeshott, I.
& Watts, R.

Bank gloom deepens over UK economy

The Sunday
Times (London)

August 22,
2011

Keoun, B. &
Kuntz, P.

Wall Street Aristocracy Got $1.2 trillion in
Secret Loans

Bloomberg

August 26,
2011

Lewis, K.

Fed affects banks, rates, prices, and jobs

Bankrate.com

September 8,
2011

Alloway, T.

European banks face funding problems

Financial Times

October 2,
2011

Day, I. &
Watts, R.

Euro bank on brink as debt crisis spreads

The Sunday
Times (London)

October 24,
2011

Alloway, T.

French financials lead increase in
borrowing from the ECB

Financial Times

November
27, 2011

Ivry, B.,
Keoun, B., &
Kuntz, P.

Secret Fed Loans Gave Banks $13 billion
Undisclosed to Congress

Bloomberg
Market Magazine

December
16, 2011

Hall, M.

France: Strip UK of its credit rating

The Express
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Table 6: Comparison of Loans Requested and Funded, by period
Based on loan-level data from Thomson One database, this study compares
commercial lending activity during the stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through
September 30, 2011 to the non-stimulus period of October 1, 2002 through
September 30, 2006 to determine how commercial banks responded to credit stimuli.
This table reflects loans requested (i.e. demand for credit) in Panel A, loans funded,
aggregated (i.e. supply of credit) in Panel B, and loans funded, by region in Panel C.

Panel A - Loans Reqijested
Stimulus Period
October 1,2007 September 30,2011
Description
Total of Loans
Requested
LESS: Requests from
Non-Public Entities
Net Loans Requested
from Public Companies
LESS: Public
Companies with No
Tickers
Net Loans Requested
from Researchable
Public Companies
LESS: Denied Loan
Requests from Public
Companies

Net Loan Requests
Approved
by All Lenders for
Funding to
Public Companies

Quantity

Value ($ mil)

Non-Stimulus Period
October 1,2002 September 30, 2006
Quantity

Value ($ mil)

49,053

$24,927,967

50,858

$24,403,071

(33,057)

$(13,416,916)

(33,375)

$(12,692,059)

15,996

$11,511,051

17,483

$11,711,012

(204)

$(84,413)

(585)

$(299,643)

15,792

$11,426,638

16,898

$11,411,369

(1,747)

$(1,988,368)

(4,896)

$(4,439,892)

14,045

$9,438,270

12,002

$6,971,477
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Table 6: Continued

Panel B - Loans Funded, aggregated
Stimulus Period
October 1,2007 September 30,2011
Description
Net Loan Requests
Approved by Ail Lenders
for Funding to Public
Companies

Quantity

14,045

LESS: Portion of Loan
Requests not Funded

Value ($ mil)

$9,438,270

Non-Stimulus Period
October 1, 2002 September 30,2006
Quantity

12,002

$(3,707,566)

Value ($ mil)

$6,971,477

$(2,678,444)

Total Loans Funded by
All Lenders

14,045

$5,730,704

12,002

$4,293,033

LESS: Loans funded by
Lenders/Syndicates of
Non-US-, Non-France-,
Non-Germany, and NonU.K.-based financial
institutions

(11,314)

$(4,871,870)

(9,460)

$(3,687,615)

Net Loans Funded by
U.S.-, France-,
Germany-and U.K.based Commercial
Banks

2,731

$858,834

2,542

$605,418

Percentage of Total
Loans Funded

19.4%

14.3%

21.2%

14.1%
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Table 6: Continued
Panel C - Loans Funded, by region
Stimulus Period
October 1, 2007 September 30,2011

Non-Stimulus Period
October 1,2002 September 30, 2006

Quantity

Value ($ mil)

Quantity

Loans Funded by U.S.based Commercial
Banks

1,977

$670,385

1,844

$434,790

Loans Funded by
France-, Germany, and
U.K.-based Commercial
Banks

754

$188,449

698

$170,628

Net Loans Funded by
U.S.- and EU3- based
Commercial Banks

2,731

$858,834

2,542

$605,418

Description

Value ($ mil)
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Table 7: Summary Statistics of Final Data Sample
After an examination of the net loan requests approved by all lenders to public companies, it
was determined that loans approved by lenders based in the United States (U.S.) and the
European Union countries of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (U.K.) represented
more than 75% of the lending activity during the two periods of study. Therefore, loans funded
by commercial banks based in those countries, solely or in syndicates, in both periods are
included in the final data sample. This table reflects the funding of the 25 U.S.-based and nine
France- and U.K.-based commercial banks, as well as their subsidiaries, that made loans in
both periods.

Stimulus Period
October 1,2007 September 30,2011

Non-Stimulus Period
October 1,2002September 30,2006

Loans funded
by France-,
Germany-, and
U.K.-based
Commercial
Banks

Loans funded
by U.S.-based
Commercial
Banks

1,977

754

1,844

698

$670,385

$188,449

$434,790

$170,628

Minimum ($ mil)

$1.00

$0.48

$1.00

$2.53

Maximum ($ mil)

$14,741.00

$8,253.00

$7,575.00

$6,558.00

Average ($ mil)

$339.10

$249.93

$235.79

$244.45

3.42

4.05

3.55

4.50

Description

Quantity
Total Value
Funded ($ mil)

Average Time to
Final Maturity
(years)

Loans funded
by U.S.-based
Commercial
Banks

Loans funded
by France-,
Germany-, and
U.K.-based
Commercial
Banks
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Table 8: Denied Uses of Proceeds in Stimulus Period
Though loans were approved during the 2002 through 2006 period with the following list of 12
items as proposed uses of proceeds, loans with the listed proposed uses were fully denied in
the 2007 through 2011 period. Figure 7 shows the uses that received full or partial approval.

Aircraft Financing & Airports
Energy
Export/Import Financing
Finance Linked-Trade
Highways/Roads
Investment in Liquid Assets
Mortgage Financing
Other
Payment on Borrowings
Project Finance
Public-Private Partnership
T elecommunications
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Table 9: Scorecard of U.S. Credit Stimuli
This table contains an unofficial “scorecard” of the policy recommendations based on the
research referenced in this paper compared to the credit stimuli enacted by the U.S. Federal
Reserve System and government agencies. The highest score for each recommendation is
1.00. A score of 0.50 was given when the recommendation was partially carried out. Though
the author of this paper is not aware of whether or not U.S. credit stimuli were determined
based on the recommendations stated, it is interesting to note that many of the researchbased ideas were put into place. A simple calculation of 8.50 out of 12 possible points results
in a 70.83% score for the decision makers on U.S. credit stimuli. Additional stimulus actions
were taken that were not recommended by the research identified in this paper.

Author(s)

Diamond &
Dybvig (1986)

Diamond &
Dybvig (1986)
and Diamond &
Rajan (2000)

Policy Recommendations
based on Research

Preserve the ability for
banks to create liquidity

Retain the safeguards of
deposit insurance and
ensure that all deposits are
covered so that lending can
increase

U.S. Credit Stimuli

Several programs were
established to provide banks with
access to short-term credit or
borrowers with direct liquidity to
relieve the pressure on the banks.

Deposit insurance was retained
and was increased during the
crisis period from $100,000 to
$250,000 per depositor, per
insured bank, for each account
ownership category. That level of
coverage was permanently set by
the Dodd-Frank Act. However, it
does not cover all deposits

Score

1.00

0.50
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Table 9: Continued
Author(s)

Policy Recommendations
based on Research

U.S. Credit Stimuli

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection
Act was enacted in 2010 to lower
risks in the U.S. financial system.

Diamond &
Dybvig (1986)
and Mora (2010)

Counteract the safeguards
so that banks do not take
on too much risk

Thakor(1996)

In connection with
increasing the money
supply, decrease long-term
rates more than short-term
rates to ensure that lending
can increase

Long-term rates did not decrease
more than short-term rates;
Actually, the opposite occurred;
short-term rates decreased more
than long-term rates.

Ensure that the capital
infusion is "substantially
large" to go beyond
preventing bank runs so
that lending can increase.

Capital infusion was "substantially
large", as best as that can be
defined.

Diamond &
Rajan (2000)

Zeltkevic (2009)

Zeltkevic (2009)

Unclog capital markets so
that funds are available for
lending

Engage in fiscal stimulus to
create a demand for lending

Score

1.00

0.00

1.00

Capital infusions, purchase of toxic
assets, and other programs were
established to "unclog" capital
markets

1.00

The Economic Stimulus Act of
2008 and the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 are
two fiscal stimulus actions of the
U.S. government.

1.00
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Table 9: Continued

Author(s)

Mora (2010)

Mora (2010)

Policy
Recommendations
based on Research

Provide direct interventions
into the markets to increase
the supply of credit

Enhance the supervision
and regulation of banks
considered "too big to fail"

U.S. Credit Stimuli

Programs such as the Commercial
Paper Funding Facility (CPFF)
were designed as direct
interventions

Score

1.00

The Dodd-Frank Act, as described
above, as well as the Supervisory
Capital Assessment Program (or
"stress tests") enhanced
supervision of the largest banks.
1.00

Cole (2012)

Cole (2012)

Cole (2012)

Increase capital
requirements

In 2007, the provisions of Basel II,
which increased risk-based capital
requirements and put other
guidelines in place, were adopted.

Reduce the size of the
largest banks

(No action taken)

Encourage the formation of
new banks

(No action taken)

1.00

0.00

0.00

Total Score out of 12 points possible

8.50
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Table 10: Summary Statistics of Sample of U.S.-based Commercial Banks
This table provides statistical information about the characteristics and lending activities of the
25 U.S.-based commercial banks in the study sample. The banks were separated into three
size categories based on the average of the annual total assets for the years of the stimulus
and non-stimulus period, respectively. The splits were set to achieve equal numbers of banks
in each size category for each period. Panel A presents the number of banks in each size
category and the name of the banks. Panel B provides summary statistics on each size
category. The statistics on participation in stimulus programs relates to the six stimulus
programs being tested in this study for which the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury
Department made detailed participation data available. The change in the number and value
of loans provides the data for the dependent variable in the regression analysis.

Panel A - U.S.-based Commercial Banks, by size
Description

Small less than
$25 billion

Medium $25 - $400 billion

Largegreater than
$400 billion

Number of Banks

5

16

4

Name of Banks

Bank Of Hawaii Corp.

Bank Of New York Mellon
Corp.

(in alpha order)

BOK Financial Corp.

BB & T Corp.

Bank of America
Corp.
Citigroup Inc.
JP Morgan Chase
& Co.

Cullen Frost Bankers

CIT Group Inc.

Wells Fargo
Company
SVB Financial Group

Comerica Inc.

UMB Financial Corp.

Fifth Third Bancorp
First Horizon National Corp.
Huntington Bancshares Inc.
Keycorp
M & T Bank Corp.
Northern Trust Corp.
PNC Financial Services Group
Regions Financial Corp.
State Street Corp.
SunTrust Banks Inc.
US Bancorp
Zions Bancorporation

&
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Table 10: Continued
Panel B - Sample Statistics, by size of bank
Stimulus Period
October 1,2007 September 30,2011

Description

Small less than
$25
billion

Number of
Banks

5

Non-Stimulus Period
October 1,2002 September 30,2006

Medium $25 - $400
billion

Small less
than
$25
billion

Medium

Large greater
than $400
billion

$25$400
billion

Large greater
than $400
billion

16

4

5

16

4

Minimum Total
Assets ($ mil)

$11,586

$28,719

$1,136,729

$5,085

$30,520

$425,729

Maximum
Total Assets
($ mil)

$23,305

$286,522

$2,030,517

$14,907

$198,623

$1,444,736

1

5

5

n/a

n/a

n/a

48

1,048

2,872

16

912

2,728

$2,120

$74,102

$594,163

$364

$58,532

$375,894

Number of
Stimulus
Programs of
Participation
Number of
Commercial
Loan
Transactions
Value of
Commercial
Loan
Transactions
($ mil)
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Table 11: Regression Results based on Change in Number of Transactions
The dependent variable is the change in the number of loan transactions, which is calculated
as the number in the stimulus period minus the non-stimulus period, per bank, per quarter.
The data for each independent variable is lagged one quarter to address endogeneity. Pvalues are shown in brackets with *, **, and *** indicating significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.
(2)

(1)
Intercept

1.2015
[0.0484]

* *

AMLF

-0.0001
[0.3963]

CPFF

0.0023
[0.0062]

★★★

0.0007
[0.0122]

* *

11.6706
[0.0014]

* * *

-0.0002
[0.0087]

★ **

CPP

SCAP

TAF

(4)

(3)

-2.9340
[0.4017]

-3.0051
[0.3924]

-39.7517

-0.0001
[0.9547]

-0.0001
[0.9167]

-0.0001
[0.5751]

0.0023
[0.0046]

0.0023
[0.0049]

***

0.0008
[0.0146]

0.0007
[0.0265]

**

-11.0134

-10.9663
[0.0149]

**

-0.0002

***

[0.0143]
-0.0002
[0.0046]

Change in
Deposits

[0.0058]

***

[0.0000]

0.0024

***

[0.0008]
0.0005

**

[0.0840]

-13.1847

***

[0.0013]
-0.0002

***

[0.0059]

0.0000
[0.7881]

Total
Deposits

0.0001
[0.0000]

Bank Fixed
Effects

N

Y

Y

Y

Time Fixed
Effects

N

Y

Y

Y

Number of
Observations

400

400

400

400

R2

0.0779

0.3045

0.3047

0.4325

Adjusted R2

0.0662

0.2183

0.2163

0.3604

***
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Table 12: Regression Results based on Change in Value ($ mil) Contributed
The dependent variable is the change in the value ($ mil) contributed by each commercial
bank to the loan. The change in value is calculated as the value in the stimulus period minus
the non-stimulus period, per bank, per quarter. The data for each independent variable is
lagged one quarter to address endogeneity. P-values are shown in brackets with *, **, and ***
indicating significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
(1)
Intercept

AMLF

CPFF

CPP

647.81
[0.0007]

TAF

(3)

(4)

1316.47

1290.13

-6952.03

[0.1356]

[0.1452]

[0.0000]
-0.0291
[0.4028]

-0.0186
[0.6450]

-0.0140

-0.1675

[0.7089]

[0.6611]

0.1098
[0.6234]

0.1326
[0.5046]

0.15202

0.1667

[0.4583]

[0.3650]

0.1494

0.0678
[0.3871]

0.0571

0.0065
[0.9286]

[0.0481]
SCAP

(2)

-2042.83
[0.0354]

-2766.37

-0.0228
[0.1871]

-0.0409

[0.4916]
**

-2748.93
[0.0154]

**

-3254.00
[0.0020]

***

**

-0.04331
[0.0178]

**

-0.0357

**

[0.0145]

[0.0175]

Change in
Deposits

[0.0252]

0.0024
[0.6929]

Total
Deposits

0.0117
[0.0000]

Bank Fixed
Effects
Time Fixed
Effects
Number of
Observations
r2
Adjusted R2

***

N

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

400

400

400

400

0.3484
0.2677

0.3487
0.2659

0.0269
0.0145

0.4438
0.3731

***
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Table 13: Regression Results by S ize of Bank

This table reflects the regression results by size of bank. The dependent variable is the
change in the number of loan transactions, which is calculated as the number in the stimulus
period minus the non-stimulus period, per bank, per quarter. The data for each independent
variable is lagged one quarter to address endogeneity. The split of the banks by size is shown
in Table 10. P-values are shown in brackets with *, **, and *** indicating significance at 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively.

Intercept

Small

Medium

-0.5852

-11.8589

[0.3468]

[0.0000]

-31.1744
[0.0021]

n/a

-0.0001

-0.0019

[n/a]

[0.8060]

[0.2550]

n/a
[n/a]

n/a
[n/a]

0.0027

-0.0027
[0.6383]

-0.0013
[0.0359]

[0.1808]

n/a
[n/a]

-3.4395
[0.1488]

[0.9894]

-0.0006
[0.4137]

0.0000
[0.9051]

AMLF

CPFF

CPP

SCAP

TAF

Total Deposits

Large

-0.0003
[0.0036]

***

0.0001
[0.0000]

***

[0.0579]
0.0016

0.3664

-0.0001
[0.9079]
0.0000
[0.8679]

Bank Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Time Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

Number of Observations

80

256

64

R2

0.4374

0.4957

0.7732

Adjusted R2

0.2202

0.4154

0.6515

***

**
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Table 14: Regression Results by Decrease or Increase in Lending
This table reflects the regression results of the seven commercial banks that had a decrease in
commercial lending compared to the 18 commercial banks that had an increase in commercial
lending. The dependent variable is the change in the number of loan transactions, which is
calculated as the number of transactions in the stimulus period minus those in the non-stimulus
period, per bank, per quarter. The data for each independent variable are lagged one quarter
to address endogeneity.
P-values are shown in brackets with *, **, and *** indicating significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
Decrease
Intercept

-10.1783

Increase
***

-44.4935

[0.0003]

[0.0000]

AMLF

0.0001
[0.8647]

-0.0001
[0.5852]

CPFF

n/a

0.0026
[0.0017]

[n/a]
CPP

SCAP

TAF

Total Deposits

0.0001
[0.0169]

**

-8.2606

*

[0.4891]
-15.7019
[0.0035]

-0.0001
[0.8094]

-0.0001

***

**

[0.0369]
***

0.0001
[0.0000]

Bank Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Time Fixed Effects

Y

Y

112

288

Number of Observations

***

0.0003

[0.0956]

0.0000
[0.0011]

***

R2

0.4916

0.4310

Adjusted R2

0.3361

0.3441

***

104

Table 15: Event Study Results of Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns
This event-study analysis reflects the response of the market during three periods. The “loan
date” is the date that the loan or stimulus participation was transacted, The “twin period” is the
range of dates between the transaction date and the date of release of information for the
application programs. The “release date” is the date that the Federal Reserve Board provided
participation information to the public. Panel A presents the results according to the Market
Model. Panel B presents the results according to the Market-adjusted Model.

Panel A - Market Model
Market Model
Program

Loan

Twin

Release
NonParticipa
nts

Participants
AMLF
(positive: negative)

CPFF
(positive: negative)

CPP
(positive: negative)

SCAP
(positive: negative)

TAF
(positive: negative)

28.64%
(40:1)

***

-11.44%
(14:17)

$

-129.96%
(6:25)

-28.89%
(6:15)

*

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

23.14%

10.70%
(22:19)

$

10.53%
(4:0)

*

13.18%
(19:2)

* *

***

16.22%
(5:0)

***

11.89%
(18:2)

* * *

(6:5)

6.54%
(132:120)

$

-26.98%
(121:131)

***

13.70%
(14:2)

***

11.08%

★★★

(9:0)

$ = 0.10 significance; * = 0.05 significance; ** = 0.01 significance; *** = 0.001 significance
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Table 15: Continued
Panel B: Market-adjusted Model
Program

Market-adjusted Model
Twin

Loan

Release
NonParticipants

Participants
AMLF
(positive:
negative)

CPFF
(positive:
negative)

9.78%

***

(30:11)

1.58%

$

(20:11)

CPP
(positive:
negative)

-13.27%

SCAP
(positive:
negative)

35.08%

TAF
(positive:
negative)

5.93%

45.50%

9.66%

(36:5)

(4:0)

41.70%

9.51%

(28:3)

(5:0)

*

6.35%

* * *

(17:4)

**

6.22%

* * *

(16:4)

n/a

n/a

n/a

$

n/a

n/a

n/a

$

48.72%

6.92%

(209:43)

(13:3)

(10:11)

(10:1)

(138:114)

**

6.80%

* *

(8:1)

$ = 0.10 significance; * = 0.05 significance; ** = 0.01 significance; *** = 0.001 significance
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Table 16: Event Study Results of Bank-Specific Stimulus Efforts
In addition to the general stimuli that was made available to the eligible financial institutions,
the Federal Reserve Board and government agencies also provided stimuli specifically to
designated banks for identified purposes. The event-study analysis of those transactions, on
the date of execution, is provided using both the Market Model and the Market-adjusted Model.

Bank
JP Morgan & Co., Inc.
(March 14, 2008)

Marketadjusted Model

Market Model
-17.37%

0.35%

Bank of America Corp.
(June 5, 2008)

-5.61%

-12.98%

Citigroup
(September 29, 2008)

51.06%

**

4.24%

Wells Fargo & Co., Inc.
(October 12, 2008)

75.02%

**

35.85%

Bank of America Corp.
(January 16, 2009)

-80.53%

*

-78.94%

$ = 0.10 significance; * = 0.05 significance; ** = 0.01 significance; *** = 0.001 significance

$
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Table 17: Summary Statistics of Sample of EU-based Commercial Banks
This table provides statistical information about the characteristics and lending activities of the
nine EU-based commercial banks in the study sample. The banks were separated into three
size categories based on the average of the annual total assets for the years of the stimulus
and non-stimulus period, respectively. The splits were set to achieve equal numbers of banks
in each size category for each period. Panel A presents the number of banks in each size
category and the name of the banks. Panel B provides summary statistics on each size
category. The statistics on participation in stimulus programs relates to the nine stimulus
programs being tested in this study for which the European Central Bank, Bank of England and
the governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom made detailed participation
data available. The change in the number and value of loans provides the data for the
dependent variable in the regression analysis.

Panel A - EU-based Commercial Banks, by size

Description

Small

Medium

Large

Number of
Banks
Name of Banks

Commerzbank AG

Barclays PLC

BNP Paribas SA

Lloyds Banking
Group

Credit Agricole
Corporate and
Investment Bank

Deutsche Bank

Societe Generale SA

The Royal Bank
of Scotland Group
PLC

(in alpha order)

Standard Chartered
Bank PLC
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Table 17: Continued
Panel B - Sample Statistics, by size of bank
Stimulus Period

Non-Stimulus Period

October 1,2007 September 30, 2011

October 1, 2002 September 30, 2006

Description

Small less than
$1.50
trillion

Medium $1.50$2.50
trillion

Large greater
than $2.50
trillion

Small less than
$750
billion

Medium $750
billion $1,225
trillion

Large greater
than
$1,225
trillion

Number of
Banks

3

3

3

3

3

3

Minimum
Total Assets
($ mil)

$461,341

$1,526,109

$2,668,650

$171,956

$ 874,562

$1,237,338

Maximum
Total Assets
($ mil)

$1,205,427

$2,472,935

$2,886,150

$560,531

$1,201,596

$1,294,443

Number of
Stimulus
Programs of
Participation

6

3

6

n/a

n/a

n/a

Number of
Commercial
Loan
Transactions

289

376

608

214

404

458

$ 58,538

$ 97,166

$31,779

$ 58,177

Value of
Commercial
Loan
Transactions
($ mil)

$

32,745

$ 80,672
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Table 18: Regression Results based on Change in Number and Value ($ mil) of Loans
This table presents regression models using both the change in the number of loan
transactions (columns (1) and (2)) and the change in the value ($ mil) contributed (columns (3)
and (4)) as the dependent variable. In addition, columns (2) and (4) add the participation in
U.S, Federal Reserve credit stimuli to the model. The data for each independent variable is
lagged one quarter to address endogeneity. P-values are shown in brackets with *, **, and ***
indicating significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

ID
Intercept

___(2)____________0)

(41

-1.7100

829.0687

[0.5394]

[0.2160]

0.0003
[0.7231]
0.0001
[07621]

0.0003
[0.7385]

0.0899

0.0001
[0.8177]

[0.5248]

-0.0431
[0.5612]

ConversionUK

-0.0005

0.6202
[0.2207]

0.5170
[0.3409]

RecapUK

[0.8144]
0.0011
[0.2983]

-0.0003
[0.8807]
0.0011
[0.3055]

-0.0315
[0.9041]
0.0041

-0.0154
[0.9536]
0.0041

EU Credit Stimuli:
SubDebtFR
CapinjectUK

SLSUK

-1.5094
[0.5734]

StressTestECB

0.0000
[0.0243]
-1.0816

Total Deposits

[0.8800]
0.0000
[0.9032]

**

0.0000
[0.0236]
-0.9202

738.8213
[0.2876]
0.1353
[0.5879]

[0.7055]
-0.0462

"

*

[0.0813]
-60.3721

[0.0817]
-20.4361

[0.8988]

[0.9730]

0.0000
[0.8893]

-0.0011
[0.3207]

[0.9909]
-0.0011
[0.3184]

US Credit Stimuli:
CPFFUS

-0.0001

TAFUS

[0.8973]
0.0000

0.0496
[0.5469]
0.0002

[0.6605]

[0.9920]

Bank Fixed
Effects
Time Fixed
Effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Number of
Observations

144

144

144

144

R2
Adjusted R2

0.4725
0.3325

0.4734
0.3216

0.3629
0.1938

0.3654
0.1825
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Table 19: Regression Results by Size of Bank
This table reflects the regression results by size of bank. The dependent variable is the
change in the number of loan transactions, which is calculated as the number in the stimulus
period minus the non-stimulus period, per bank, per quarter. The data for each independent
variable is lagged one quarter to address endogeneity. The split of the banks by size is shown
in Table 17. P-values are shown in brackets with *, **, and *** indicating significance at 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively.
Small_________
Intercept

7.5642

**

Medium_______
2.0368

Large

[0.0558]

[0.5962]

6.0046
[0.2736]

n/a

0.0021

-0.0021

[0.4436]

EU Credit Stimuli:
SubDebtFR

0.0000
[0.9142]

n/a

[0.3106]
n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

RecapUK

-0.0056

0.0022
[0.5207]

-0.0001
[0.7468]

SLSUK

[0.5947]
0.0000

n/a

StressTestECB

[0.2616]
2.6061
[0.7333]

0.0000
[0.2047]

n/a

n/a

Total Deposits

-0.0001

-0.0001

[0.7805]

[0.6793]

-0.0001
[0.3918]

-0.0033
[0.4749]

0.0000
[0.9696]

0.0000
[0.5027]

0.0001

-0.0001
[0.7564]
Y

-0.0001
[0.4244]

CapinjectUK
Conversion UK

US Credit Stimuli:
CPFFUS
TAFUS
Bank Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
Number of
Observations

[0.5520]
Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

48

48

48

R2

0.6479

0.6239

0.5745

Adjusted R2

0.2805

0.2930

0.1667
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Table 20: Regression Results by Decrease or Increase in Lending
This table reflects the regression results of the four EU-based commercial banks that had a
decrease in commercial lending (column (1)) compared to the five that had an increase in
commercial lending (column (2)). The dependent variable is the change in the number of loan
transactions, which is calculated as the number of transactions in the stimulus period minus
those in the non-stimulus period, per bank, per quarter. The data for each independent variable
are lagged one quarter to address endogeneity. P-values are shown in brackets with *, **, and
*** indicating significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Decrease
Intercept
EU Credit Stimuli:
SubDebtFR
CapinjectUK
Conversion UK

3.0210

10.1341

[0.3176]

[0.0195]

0.0004

-0.0016
[0.2900]

[0.4325]
-0.0002
[0.4325]

n/a

n/a

0.0006
[0.7437]
n/a

0.0000
[0.1254]

StressTestECB
Total Deposits
US Credit Stimuli:
CPFFUS
TAFUS

n/a

0.0010
[0.6037]

RecapUK
SLSUK

Increase

n/a
0.0000
[0.2956]

-1.1447
[0.8836]
-0.0001
[0.1106]

-0.0004

-0.0007

[0.3376]

[0.3288]
-0.0001
[0.8557]

0.0000
[0.9631]

Bank Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Time Fixed Effects

Y
64

Y

Number of Observations

80

R2

0.6985

0.4493

Adjusted R2

0.5002

0.1943
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Figure 1: History of U.S., EU, and U.K. Central Bank Rate Movement
This figure shows the movement of the key lending rates of the U.S., EU, and U.K. central
banks during the period of October 2006 through September 2012 to show the rates prior to
stimulus actions and more recently. In Panel A, it is seen that the U.S. Federal Reserve Board
took its first action in August 2007 and continued to reduce rates from a spread of 1.00% to as
low as 0.25% before settling on a spread of 0.50%. In Panel B, the graph reflects the initial
increase in rates by the European Central Bank (ECB), in an effort to maintain price stability,
before reducing rates in October 2008, more than one year after the Federal Reserve reduced
its key rates. Panel C reflects the movement of the official bank rate of the Bank of England,
the central bank of the U.K. At the end of the charted period, all three central banks show very
low rates.
SOURCES: http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/statistics/dlyrates/fedrate.html and
http://www.ecb.int/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/pages/iadb/notesiadb/wholesale_baserate.aspx
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Figure 1: Continued
Panel B: EU - European Central Bank Rate Movement
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Figure 1: Continued
Panel C: U.K. - Bank of England Central Bank Rate Movement
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Figure 2: Effects of Expansionary Monetary Policy
This figure shows the effects of expansionary monetary policy on the goods market (IS) and the
money market (LM), which represent the Mundell-Fleming Model (i.e. the IS/LM curve for open
economies). According to Mankiw (2010) and classical economic theory, the increase in the
money supply, as brought on by expansionary monetary policy, results in a shift of the LM curve
to the right to reflect the increase in income. This increase in income leads to a fall in real
interest rates, which is designed to spur net capital outflow by way of bank lending.
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Figure 3: Commercial Loans funded by U.S.-based Commercial Banks,
by year
Based on the commercial loans funded by U.S.-based commercial banks, the number of
loans, loan value in millions of dollars, and average loan size during the stimulus period
exceeded that of the non-stimulus period after fiscal period two. Panels A, B, and C below
show this result graphically.

Panel A - Number of Loans, by year
NOTE: Each period is designated by the dates identified in the table shown:

Period

Stimulus Period
2007 - 2011

1
2
3
4

Oct 2007 - Sept 2008
Oct 2008 - Sept 2009
Oct 2009 - Sept 2010
Oct 2010 - Sept 2011

Non-Stimulus Period
2002 - 2006
Oct2002- Sept 2003
Oct2003- Sept 2004
Oct2004- Sept 2005
Oct2005- Sept 2006

Number of Loans, by year
800
729
641
600
S

Number of
Loans

458
405

542
400
389

328

329

3

4

200
1

2
Annual Periods

2007-2011 — — 2002-2006
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Figure 3: Continued
Panel B - Total Loan Value, by year
Total Loan Value, by year
$300,000
284,255
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($ mil)
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$97,339

142,890

$149,677
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2
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3
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Panel C - Average Loan Size, by year
Average Loan Size, by year
$500.00
33.46

$400.00
$300.00

$246.7i

($ mil)
$200.00

$352.82

$276.16

$255.57
$228.15

$212.53

$ 100.00
2

3

Annual Periods
•2007 - 2011

—

-2 0 0 2 - 2006

$263.28
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Figure 4: Commercial Loans funded by France-, Germany, and U.K.-based
Commercial Banks, by year
Based on the number of loans, loan value in millions of dollars, and average loan size, the
panels below show that there was less activity in Period 4 of the stimulus period (i.e. 2007 2011) than in the non-stimulus period (i.e. 2002-2006) for the commercial loans funded by
France-, Germany-, and U.K.-based commercial banks.

NOTE: Each period is designated by the dates identified in
the table shown:
Stimulus Period
2007 - 2011

Period
1
2
3
4

Oct 2007 Oct 2008 Oct 2009 Oct 2010 -

Non-Stimulus Period
2002 - 2006

Sept 2008
Sept 2009
Sept 2010
Sept 2011

Oct 2002
Oct 2003
Oct 2004
Oct 2005

- Sept 2003
- Sept 2004
- Sept 2005
- Sept 2006

Panel A - Number of Loans, per year

Number of Loans, per year
250

224

200
150
Number
of Loans

203

187

161

214
158 .

169
136

100

2

3
Annual Periods
•2007-2011
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Figure 4: Continued
Panel B - Total Loan Value, per year
Total Loan Value, by year
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Figure 5: Global Approved versus Denied Loan Requests from
Public Companies
Based on the value of the loans, per Table 6, more loan requests from public companies were
approved in the 2007-2011 stimulus period than in the 2002-2006 non-stimulus period. In the
period of 2002 through 2006, 61 % of the loans requested were approved. However, in the
period of 2007 through 2011, during which credit stimuli were in place, the approval
percentage increased to 83% of the loans requested.

Panel A - Stimulus Period of October 2007 through September 2011

Loans Approved versus Denied, by loan value
October 1,2007 - September 30,2011
Denied Requests
17%

Approved
Requests
83% "

Panel B -Non-Stimulus Period of October 2002 through September 30,2006
Loans Approved versus Denied, by loan value
October 1,2002 - September 30,2006

Denied Requests
39%
Approved
Requests
61%
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Figure 6: Top Five Home Countries of Loan Requestors
U.S.-based lenders were faced with requests for funds from companies in 63 countries during
the 2007-2011 period and from 72 countries during the 2002-2006 period. The resulting
commercial loans in both periods were provided primarily to companies based in the U.S.

Panel A - Top Five Home Countries during period of October 2007 - September 2011

Top Five Home Countries
of Loan Requestors
October 1,2007 - September 30,2011
□ U.S.-funded Borrower
United States

Denied Requestor
28.68%

71.32%

United Kingdom 3.3 3 %

96.67%

Japan

55.00%

45.00%

6i82%

33 .18%

Canada

24.74%

75.26%

Australia

0.00%

100.00%

Hong Kong

Panel B - Top Five Home Countries during period of October 2002 - September 2006

Top Five Home Countries
of Loan Requestors
October 1,2002 - September 30,2006
□ U.S.-funded Borrower
United States
United Kingdom
India
France
Canada
Australia

41.89%

)

a Denied Requestor
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Figure 7: Industries of Loan Requestors
As U.S.-based lenders made decisions on lending to commercial entities, some industries
received more funding than others. Per Panel C, the net approval rate for the utilities, money,
and other industry groupings was lower than that of any other industries.

Panel A - Industries of Loan Requestors - October 2007 - September 2011
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Figure 7: Continued

Panel B - Industries of Loan Requestors - October 2002 - September 2006
Industries of Loan Requestors
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Figure 7: Continued

Panel C - Net Approval Rate over the Two Periods
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Figure 8: Net Loan Approval Rates based on Proposed Uses of Proceeds
In the period of 2007-2011, U.S.-based lenders evaluated loan requests with 42 proposed
uses of the proceeds. Panel A shows the 14 uses that experienced a positive net loan
approval rate. Panel B shows the 16 uses that experienced a negative net loan approval rate.
Table 8 shows the list those proposed uses of loan proceeds that were fully denied during the
2007-2011 period.

Panel A - Proposed Uses of Proceeds with Positive Net Loan Approval Rates

Proposed Uses of Proceeds with
Positive Net Loan Approval Rates
October 1 ,2 0 0 7 - September 30,2011
100%

Proposed Use of Proceeds
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Figure 8: Continued

Panel B - Proposed Uses of Proceeds with Negative Net Loan Approval Rates

Proposed Uses of Proceeds with
Negative Net Loan Approval Rates
October 1 ,2 0 0 7 - September 30,2011
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Figure 9: Lending Standards, 1991 -2011
According to the October 2011 Senior Lending Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending
Practices, produced by the Federal Reserve System, the net percentage of banks (i.e.
domestic respondents) reported that they primarily loosened lending standards during the non
stimulus period while the stimulus period saw greater net tightening followed by reduced
tightening.

Net Percentage of Domestic Respondents Tightening Standards for Commercial and Industrial Loans
D"~int
Stimulus
Period

Non-Stimulus
Period

100

Loans to large and middle-market firms
Loans to small firms

1991

1993

1995

1997

f

1999

2001

2005

2007

2009

Source:http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/201111/default.htm

2011
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Figure 10 - Stock Price Trend of EU-based Commercial Banks, by country
This figure provides a visual depiction of the market’s reaction to the nine commercial banks in
the sample of this study. Panel A shows the stock price trend of the France-based commercial
banks that trade on the Euronext Paris stock exchange. Panel B shows the stock price trend
of the Germany-based commercial banks that trade on the Frankfurt stock exchange. Panel C
shows the stock price trend of the United Kingdom-based commercial banks that trade on the
London stock exchange. Each panel presents the stock prices on the trading days during the
stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2011.
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Figure 10: Continued

Panel B - Germany-based Commercial Banks
Stock Price Trend of Germany-based Commercial Banks
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APPENDIX A: Endnotes
1 The period of October 1, 2002 through September 30, 2006 is being identified as the
“non-stimulus” period because the timeframe contained substantially fewer programs for
depository institutions than the stimulus period of October 1, 2007 through September 30,
2011. For example, the author is aware that the non-stimulus period included changes to
the discount window program in 2003 that added primary credit and secondary credit
programs to this overnight-only lending facility.

However, the discount window’s terms

were extended on primary credit loans to up to 30 days in August 2007 and was further
extended to up to 90 days in March 2008. (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2010). In
addition to the expanded benefits of the discount window program, the stimulus period
includes multiple new policy innovations to aid depository institutions through the 2008
financial crisis.

Therefore, the periods are designated as stimulus versus non-stimulus

based on the differences in benefits to the banks and the increased quantity of programs
in the stimulus period.

2The findings from the GAO Audit of the Federal Reserve System’s programs are outside
of the scope of this research. For further information, the full report can be found at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d 11696.pdf.

3The author is aware that the sources of funds for commercial lending are only one aspect
of the determinants of bank lending. Other determinants include the demand for lending,
lending standards, etc. However, given the focus of this paper on whether or not the credit
stimuli was able to incentivize the banks to lend, it is appropriate to address the
determinants of lending for which the central banks and government agencies could
influence. Those determinants are the source of funds available for commercial lending.

145

APPENDIX A: Continued
4lt must be noted that, the majority of the referenced studies were based on the
requirements of Basel I, that went into effect in 1988. Basel I was superseded by Basel
II in 2004. On July 20, 2007, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
issued a joint press release with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision stating their agreement in
implementing Basel II in the United States with the goals of consistency with international
approaches and sensitivity to risks. (Board, 2007) Basel II set forth a "three pillar"
framework that encompassed risk-based capital requirements for credit risk, market risk,
and operational risk (Pillar 1); supervisory review of capital adequacy (Pillar 2); and market
discipline through enhanced public disclosures (Pillar 3). Given that Basel II was adopted
by the Federal Reserve at the beginning of the 2008 financial crisis, it is believed that its
impacts are more stringent and reflected in the lending decisions of our sample of banks
with the anticipated same impact on lending as the capital requirements of Basel I.

5Eventus software, via SAS, was used to generate the event study results under the
Market Model and the Market-adjusted Return Model.

th o u g h the overall change in the commercial lending activity of the EU3 is an increase, it
must be noted that the data for the four commercial banks of the U.K. shows a decrease in
commercial lending when the stimulus period is compared to the non-stimulus period.
That decrease of $7.7 billion reduces the $25 billion of increases in lending by France and
Germany to the $18 billion net increase that results.
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